1. Kant's Contribution
2. Kant, Functionalism and Cognitive Science
3. The Resistance of Materialists
1. The Need for a Subject
2. `One Single Experience': The Unity of Experience
3. Kant's Doctrine of Synthesis
4. The Unity of Consciousness
5. The Kind of Unity We Have
6. Tying It All Together: The Mind as a Representation
1. Defining `Bewußtsein': Outer and Inner Sense
2. Two Forms of Self-Awareness
3. `Bewußtsein': Awareness Without Self-Awareness?
4. What is Special about Apperceptive Self-Awareness
1. Transcendental Designation: The Referential Base of Self-Awareness
2. The Sources of Self-Awareness.
3. The Global Representation: Theory of the Representational Base
4. Why Apperceptive Self-Awareness is the Way It is
5. Coda: Transcendental and Empirical Aspects of the Self
1. Kant's Critical Project and How the Mind Fits Into It
2. The Location of the Subjective Deduction in the First Edition
3. The Attack on the Paralogisms in the First Edition: Synthesis and Self-Awareness
4. The Mind and Its Awareness of Itself in the Second Edition
5. The Fourth Paralogism and the Refutation of Idealism
6. Interpretive Perplexities
1. What is a Subjective Deduction, and Why Did Kant Offer One?
PART I: SYNTHESIS AND UNITY
2. Kitcher and Kant's Doctrine of Synthesis
3. Apprehension, Reproduction, Recognition in Concepts
4. Apperception and Unity of Individual Objects
5. Transcendental Apperception: The Unity of `All Appearances'
6. Synchronic Unity
PART II: THE STRANGE CASE OF SELF-AWARENESS AND THE DEDUCTION
7. Apperception and Self-Awareness
8. Why Did Kant Introduce Self-Awareness into the Deduction
1. The Paralogisms
2. Three Claims from the Subjective Deduction
3. The Introductory Remarks: The Strategies of Rational Psychology
4. The Arguments for the Second Paralogism
The Unity Argument
The Representation Argument
The Appeal to Self-Awareness
5. The Fourth Part of Kant's Discussion
1. Situating the Third Paralogism
2. The Structure of Kant's Discussion
3. Do Unity or Memory Require Identity?
4. Kant and Hume Vs. Butler and Reid, and Strawson, Too
5. Is the Unity of Consciousness Diachronic?
6. Unity as the Form of Thought: `Time is in Me'
7. Identifying the Subject with An Object
8. Results and Attitude
1. Homunculi and Self-Representing Representations
2. The Second Edition Transcendental Deduction
3. §15: Synthesis in the Second Edition
4. §16 & §17: The New Version of the Central Argument
5. The Mind as Representation
6. Self-Representation and Self-Awareness
7. Mind as Representation: Final Considerations
1. What the Subject Is, and What We Can Know About It
2. Is a Subject Merely a Formal Requirement?
3. §18: Empirical Vs. Transcendental Apperception; Epistemic Foundations
4. §24 and §25: Self-Awareness and the Noumenal Mind
5. Why Immediate Awareness of the Noumenal Mind is not Knowledge
6. Why Did Kant Claim that We are Immediately Aware of the Noumenal Mind?
7. Coda: The Mind in the Two Versions of the Deduction
8. Concluding Remarks
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PASSAGES CITED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....
This book was written with two audiences in mind. The first is the community of cognitive scientists, philosophers of mind and students of cognition in general. The second, of course, is the community of Kant scholars and those with a special interest in Kant. The case I want to make to the first audience is that some of Kant's thoughts and discoveries, as I put it in the first chapter, "have not only not been superseded by more recent work on the mind, they have not even been assimilated by it." I hope I will give this first audience reason to believe that Kant still has things to teach us. For the second audience, I will argue that some aspects of Kant's theory (better, theories) of mind have not been well understood, especially in recent English-language commentaries, and that some others have been missed altogether.
The book has been constructed with these dual objectives in view. For the first audience, the first four chapters attempt to construct an overview of Kant's model of the mind as a whole, without a lot of detailed exegesis or textual justification for the views ascribed to him. (I try to give just enough quotations and citations to show that Kant did say the thing I attribute to him.) The ideas in the last of the four, the chapter on Kant's theory of self-awareness, are the part of the project that, as Kant put it in connection with his Transcendental Deduction, "have cost me the greatest labour" and I can only echo his comment: "-- labour, as I hope, not unrewarded" (Axvii). Those who are content just to know what Kant's theory looks like can stop when they get to the end of these chapters. The remaining six chapters are for Kant scholars. They are devoted to the hard work of exegesis needed to justify my attributions and show where I think the particular views ascribed to Kant in the first four chapters arise in his work and how they fit into his general system. In my view, five discussions of the mind in The Critique of Pure Reason are particularly important, three in the first edition and two in the second. Chapters 6-10 take them up, one per chapter. In Kant, everything connects and there is a great deal that I do not discuss. To those who particularly feel the absence of one topic or another, I can only express my regrets.
The ideas in this book have had a long evolution. The first seeds were sown by P. F. (now Sir Peter) Strawson in his Kant seminars in Oxford many years ago. I am not sure how much he would recognize in the ultimate fruits of the seeds he planted. Since then, successive generations of students in my own Kant seminars have challenged me and puzzled over Kant with me year after year; I owe these students a large debt. I have been fortunate enough to have had some extremely able graduate research assistants; three who made a major contribution to this project are Deborah Knight, Richard DeVidi, and Christopher Viger. Many colleagues and students have read parts of the work as it evolved and made invaluable comments and suggestions: Michael Blake, Douglas Dryer, Lorne Falkenstein, Jack Iwanicki, Timothy Kenyon, John Leyden, Hilmar Lorenz, Lorne Maclachlan, Roland Marshall, Gordon Nagel, Jim Ramsay, Daniel Shannon, Stephen Talmage, Martin Weatherston, and Philip Wright. Lorne Falkenstein and Christopher Viger both read the text in its entirety and between them saved me a great deal of vagueness, confusion and error. Terence Moore, executive editor, Mary Racine, production editor, and Racine, copy editor, did a splendid job of assessing, editing, and producing the book. An intermediate stage in the evolution of the work was supported by a Social Science and Humanities Research Council Leave Fellowship. In the year 1991-1992, I had the good fortune to be elected Marston Lafrance Research Fellow at Carleton University. The year free of teaching and administration provided by the fellowship gave me the time to put the work into what I now know to be its final form. Carleton University awards one of these fellowships every year in its Faculty of Arts, and it would be hard to think of a better way to support research in the humanities.
The three people who have played the biggest role in my life are my wife, Christine Koggel, and my sons, George and David. All three of them have accepted the demands of this project with affection and enthusiasm. I do not know what I would do without them. Christine has also played a very large role in the project itself, extending even to the huge task of reading drafts of the work not just once but twice. Her eye for philosophical confusion and stylistic inelegance have made this a much better work than it would otherwise have been.