

REPRESENTATIONS AND REALITY: KANT'S TWO VIEWS

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1. Idealism, Realism, Noumena

In this paper, we will examine Kant's views about what we know about the world. By 'the world' here I do not mean just the spatially organized array of intentional objects of Kant's empirical realism[1]. As Kant makes clear, even when my objects of this sort are located elsewhere in space, they are nonetheless aspects of my mind. I also mean the world of things (or at least 'thing' of some numerically unspecified sort) that "exists apart from us" (A373), an "external thing distinct from all my representations" (Bxli) [2] – not just a thing "which [is] to be found in space" (A373). Kant marks the distinction in the Refutation of Idealism when he speaks of "immediate consciousness of the existence of other things [2] outside me [1]" (B276).

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* (hereafter *CPR*), Kant's writing on knowledge of [2] present us with a considerable exegetical problem. Kant, as is well-known, appears to hold two views on the question, one in most of the 1st and 2nd editions, the other in new material prepared for the 2nd, and the two views are in considerable tension with one another. The official doctrine of the *Critique* is transcendental idealism, the view that we can be immediately aware only of our own representations and have no awareness of anything as it is, not even ourselves. This doctrine is a notorious generator of sceptical and solipsistic problems. In the 2nd edition, a new transcendental realism appears, in the form of a claim that we are directly aware of objects other than ourselves, as the passage just quoted from B276 illustrates (as we will see, it is far from alone). Guyer claims that Kant's new position is ontological realism but that he retains his epistemological idealism.¹ In my view, Kant is now espousing epistemological realism of some kind, too – as the quotation above from B276 demonstrates. And the exegetical problem is this: Can this new realist strain, whatever it is exactly, be reconciled with the official idealism?

The clearest and most forthright expression of transcendental idealism in *CPR* is the critique of the Fourth Paralogism in the 1st edition. The clearest, if not entirely forthright, expressions of the new trend to realism are three passages new to the 2nd edition: the Refutation of Idealism, a long footnote to the new Preface in which Kant modifies some of the things he said in the Refutation passage (Bxxxix-xli), and subsections §24 and §25 of the new version of the Transcendental Deduction. I have discussed those two sections of the Deduction at length elsewhere², so here I will focus on the critique of the Fourth Paralogism and the Refutation of Idealism.³

One of the striking things about Kant's idealism is that it struck him as obviously true, so obviously true that he did not even need to argue for it:

Obviously, since what is without is not in me, I cannot encounter it in my apperception, nor therefore in any perception, which, properly regarded, is merely a determination of apperception. I am not, therefore, in a position to *perceive*

external things (A367-8, my emphasis; see also A104).⁴

This even though it leaves us locked inside our own minds. Nor, apparently, did he feel that the new realism of the Refutation was in tension with this view. Though the passage just quoted disappeared in the 2nd edition, the view it expressed did not. The paper to follow is mostly a build-up to asking the question, Can he hold both views consistently?

The question of Kant's idealism and never-fully-acknowledged realism connects in the most direct way to some other big issues in Kant exegesis, for example, the question of the unknowability of the noumenal. The official idealism forces very radical claims about the unknowability of anything as it is, certainly anything not oneself – and yet the very same claims seem to be inconsistent with many of his more realist-sounding pronouncement. Let me distinguish two ways in which the noumenal might be unknowable:

N¹. There is a world of some sort other than myself and I have representations with intentional objects. However, these representations and/or their objects do not give me immediate awareness of the world, though I take them to correspond to the world and postulate a world to explain, first, my having them and, second, what appears in them.
and,

N². Phenomena are things as they appear, noumena are those very same things as they are. The distinction between appearance and reality consists in (a) the permanent possibility that each and every belief, each and every theory, may be disconfirmed by future representations, and (b) our inability to have representations that represent things free of all shaping of the mind and its categories and forms of intuition. Thus, for all we know or could know, even organizing the world spatially and temporally may reflect nothing about the way the world actually is.

The crucial part of N¹ is the phrase, 'these objects never give me immediate awareness of the world'. Thus, N¹ flows directly from Kant's idealism, which, as we said, is the official doctrine of the critical philosophy (as the Transcendental Aesthetic and many other passages make clear).

It is hard to believe that N¹ exhausted Kant's view of the matter. For one thing, as applied to the self, it would entail a two-self view, a real one of which we are never aware and a phenomenal one of inner sense. Kant explicitly rejected such a duality more than once (B155, *Anthropology* 134fn.⁵). Also, N¹ raises the spectre of scepticism of a most virulent form, yet Kant either argued hard against scepticism or blithely assumed that it was not true, depending on how you read him.

On N², not only is immediate awareness of things other than ourselves possible, some form of it is required. N² is consistent with a view that we do not have something that might be called 'immediate description', every description being shaped by the mind's activities, and that even if we do have some form of immediate awareness of things other than ourselves, this awareness gives us no way to confirm descriptions directly and decisively.⁶ However, the things

that appear to us are things other than ourselves, or when what appears is oneself, it is one's real self that appears, not just an image of oneself. So N² is inconsistent with Kant's transcendental idealism and fits very comfortably with the Refutation of Idealism – and, as I have argued elsewhere, subsections §24 and §25 of the new TD.

Whether Kant ever explicitly formulated N² is difficult to determine but he did say some things very close to it, especially in the new material on negative noumena prepared for the second-edition Phenomena and Noumena chapter. For example, at B306 he distinguishes “the mode in which we intuit” objects from “the nature that belongs to them in themselves”, and calls the latter noumena. Similarly, at B308-9, he speaks, apparently in the same spirit, of “intelligible entities corresponding to the sensible entities”, where by ‘correspond’ he means that the former are the latter as they are. These passages lay out a notion of unknowability of great originality, an account that sees farther than anyone else saw in Kant's time. That Kant never developed it is a source of real regret.

We will start with a fairly long look at the critique of the Fourth Paralogism. Section 2 examines its status in the 1st edition and fate in the 2nd. In Section 3, we will discuss a key idea that animates the discussion, an idea to which we have already been introduced, that we are directly aware of only our own representations. In Section 4, we will take up the question of how Kant could have believed such an idea. In Section 5, we will examine a huge tension that it introduces in his view of perception and truth, urging that the notion becomes almost idle in Kant's system, counter-intuitive as it may be to say this. Section 6 asks whether the idea is needed for one interesting construal of transcendental idealism. In Section 7, we turn to the Refutation of Idealism and its status in *CPR*. Finally, in Section 8 we will set the critique of the Fourth Paralogism against the Refutation of Idealism.

2. The Status and Fate of the Fourth Paralogism

Before we try to relate Kant's idealism and his realism, we need to do a number of things. The first is examine the status and fate of the Fourth Paralogism. Both have been a matter of controversy. Two exegetical problems stand out: Is the Fourth Paralogism really a *paralogism*, as Kant defined the term? And, how does Kant's attack on it, which greatly shrinks in the 2nd edition, relate to the new Refutation of Idealism? The Fourth Paralogism runs as follows:

That, the existence of which can only be inferred as a cause of given perceptions, has a merely doubtful existence.

Now all outer appearances are of such a nature that their existence is not immediately perceived, and that we can only infer them as the cause of given perceptions.

Therefore the existence of all objects of the outer sense is doubtful. This uncertainty I entitle the ideality of outer appearances, and the doctrine of this ideality is called *idealism*, as distinguished from the counter-assertion of a possible certainty in regard to objects of outer sense, which is called *dualism* [A366-67].

Note that in the conclusion, Kant mentions both the view that would prevail if the argument were sound and what seemed to him to be the only alternative to it if the argument fails. He did this with no other Paralogism and he did it for a reason. It is crucial to his overall objective in the chapter on the Paralogisms, which is to insulate immortality from reason, that no arguments for *either* idealism *or* dualism demonstrate that the mind's existence is independent of the body and world. (For Kant, they must equally fail to demonstrate that it is *dependent* on these things but that is not at issue here.)

In the second edition, according to the conventional wisdom, Kant replaced his discussion of the fourth Paralogism with the Refutation of Idealism. To the extent that moving treatment of an issue from the one to the other establishes this claim, that has to be at least partly right. Both passages are concerned with immediate awareness of the external world, the discussion of the fourth Paralogism among other things, the Refutation of Idealism centrally, and Kant moved his treatment of this issue from the former discussion to the latter one in the second edition. However, this correspondence is far from the whole story. First and most obviously, the second edition still has a discussion of the Fourth Paralogism (B409) and there Kant still deals with immateriality and the mind's independence of the body. Moreover, Kant's argument there is an extension of an argument in the first edition. On A379-80, he argues that from appearances, we can learn nothing about what the ground of appearances is like. On B409, he mounts the same argument but draws a more precise conclusion: From the way I appear to myself, I cannot learn that it would be either possible or impossible to exist without things outside me existing, nor therefore whether I could exist "merely as thinking being (i.e., without existing in human form)" (B409). To be sure, the second-edition discussion is only one paragraph long; but that is true of the discussions of every individual Paralogism there.

Turning to the second issue, and again contrary to what is often said, the fourth Paralogism has the same source and aim as the other Paralogisms. The fourth Paralogism was often used by rational psychologists (Kant's name for his more rationalist predecessors – Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff) and, like the others, it is meant to relate directly to immortality. The argument attempts to justify scepticism about (sceptical idealism), or to flatly deny (dogmatic idealism), immediate awareness of and therefore non-inferential knowledge of things outside us.⁷ This fits with the other paralogisms because it aims to establish a necessary condition of immortality, namely, independence of the self from the not-self. On either version of idealism, the mind's existence is not dependent on the existence of anything else – so far as we can know on if sceptical idealism and without qualification on dogmatic idealism. If my existence is not dependent on anything else, then I am not at risk of ending by dissolution or dismemberment of anything else (though elanguescence as discussed in the 2nd edition would remain a possibility (B414)). In short, if sound the view that the fourth Paralogism seeks to establish would satisfy a condition of immortality being possible. And that is what all the other paralogisms seek to do and all they seek to do. Thus the Fourth Paralogism is a legitimate paralogism. Kant was right to take up the argument where he does and to keep it there in the 2nd edition.

The alternative to idealism, Kant tells us, is dualism: We are aware of both ourselves and

things that are “objects of outer sense” (A367). (He is thinking of a duality of knowledge of mind and world, what he calls realism a couple of pages later, not a Cartesian duality of the material and immaterial.) We will turn to it in a moment; it raises a large new issue. Kant associates sceptical idealism with Descartes (curiously enough, he does not mention Hume) and solipsistic, dogmatic idealism with Berkeley. He does not associate dualism with anyone; appropriately circumscribed, it would appear to be his own view (for evidence, see A370 and A379).⁸

Idealism and dualism are not the only possibilities. There is also materialism. If things in themselves are material, that would seem to rule out immortality. Kant toys with the idea in his discussion of the Second Paralogism (A354-61) and at the end of his discussion of the fourth (A379), but he seems not to have been impressed by it as a serious alternative. If we were aware of things as they are, it would be via some kind of intellectual (non-sensible) intuition, he held, and the objects of our awareness would have conceptual, not spatiotemporal, structure and so would not be material (a clear statement of this position in the 1st *Critique* can be found in the Appendix on the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection). We don't have such awareness, indeed we have only sensible awareness and only of our own representations at that. So any materialism that had a hope of being true would have to be a theory about a certain kind of representation. But materialism of this special kind would be compatible with idealism, as Kant makes clear in his discussion of the topic at the end of the critique of the second paralogism.⁹

If idealism and materialism (materialism of the standard sort) would have implications for the possibility of immortality, the picture is more complicated with respect to dualism. Direct awareness of the world as well as the mind would hold implications for immortality, it would seem, only if we could not exist without it – but Kant never even mentions anything like this, let alone investigates it. So why does Kant introduce dualism as an alternative to idealism?

The reason, I think, is that insulating the possibility of immortality from reason is not the only thing going on in the critique of the fourth paralogism. Indeed, immortality is not even the main topic of the passage. The main topic is what Kant calls empirical realism, which is just a special form of mind/world knowledge dualism. What is this issue doing in an attack on an argument defending the possibility of immortality? Perhaps the following. Kant wanted to support radical scepticism, so far as theoretical reason goes, about knowledge of many of the mind's most important features: its substantiality, composition, persistence, and dependence or otherwise on anything other than itself, the topics of the four paralogisms. Such scepticism flowed directly from his idealism. If space and time are merely properties of my representations of things, not things themselves, it follows immediately that I know nothing about anything as it is, including my own mind.

However, he most assuredly did *not* advocate scepticism about knowledge of other minds or the external world as experienced – and he wanted to ward off that risk as much as he wanted to insulate immortality from reason. (If I am right, that would explain why the claim in the famous Garve/Feder review that he himself was a Berkeleyan, i.e., a sceptic about knowledge of

the world and other minds as experienced, so astonished and appalled him.) Now, both sceptical and dogmatic idealism apparently imply at least scepticism about both matters but Kant was an idealist, so he had to construct an idealist alternative to them that did not. He called it empirical realism: Make space a property of me and represented objects can be located in space at places different from where I am located – and I can know this.

For the immediate purposes of the chapter, Kant could have left the balance between what we can know and what we cannot know for another occasion. In the context of his overall project, however, the issue is central. For the overall project, as we said, he required *both* radical scepticism about the knowability of the mind as it is *and* empirical realism about knowledge of the mind as it appears to itself and objects in the external world, including other minds, as they appear to us. Moreover, the two analyses are connected. The argument used to beat back scepticism about the world is that a proper idealism, namely transcendental idealism, allows full empirical realism because it supports the reality of objects in space. (As we saw, he buys this conclusion by loading space itself into the mind! We will return to this dubious move below.) The point here is that this argument if sound would also justify his scepticism about the nature of the mind; on his ‘empirical realism’, we would be utterly in the dark about how anything actually is, including minds in general and our own mind in particular.

Kant clarifies how these two conclusions relate to one another only in the concluding remarks to the chapter as a whole (A384-96). Indeed, the bigger question of how the fourth Paralogism connects to the other three becomes clear only there. On those pages he finally takes up the issue of the mind’s relation to the body. In particular, on A393-4 he discusses the implications of the fact that the mind is in communion with the body. He concludes that no one could give the “least grounds” for any assertion that, should the mode of sensibility in which objects, including our own body, appear to us as material cease, we could continue to exist as a being with sensibility of some other kind. This discussion both makes the relationship of the critique of the Fourth Paralogism to immortality clear and shows how this discussion relates to the other three. (It is also further evidence that immortality is the underlying issue in the whole chapter on the Paralogisms.¹⁰)

There is another way to show that Kant’s attack on scepticism is a legitimate part of the attack on the Paralogisms. The official topic of the fourth Paralogism ought to be my independence from anything else that exists. Sceptical and dogmatic idealism offer *prima facie* arguments for this position. So Kant needs to show that these arguments don’t support the position, as part of showing that reason (argument and evidence) cannot touch the issue of immortality in general. He can’t reject the idealism of both forms of idealism because it is the foundation of his own transcendental idealism (see, for example, A378). Kant says, of course, that he rejects both forms of idealism. However, he refutes sceptical idealism only by mounting a question-begging explication of ‘spatial object’ in which he claims that all spatial locations are within my mind, space and time being ‘forms of intuition’ imposed by the mind. That we can be immediately aware of *these* spatial objects is not too surprising. He rejects the dogmatic conclusion of dogmatic idealism, arguing that we have no reason to accept it, but not the

idealism.¹¹ And how could he? The basis for idealism in the fourth paralogism, the claim that I could never have immediate awareness of any object other than myself is the foundation of his own transcendental idealism. (Thus transcendental idealism is built on the strong, N¹ doctrine of the unknowability of the noumenal.)

If he can't attack idealism, what does he do instead? He argues (a) that idealism entails that we know nothing about the nature of anything as it is, and (b) that idealism does not block mind/world knowledge dualism, the kind of dualism that we need for knowledge of the world and other minds anyway, because this dualism is "dualism only in the empirical sense" (A379), i.e., empirical realism.

Having established that the fourth paralogism is a paralogism, I should acknowledge that the structure of Kant's discussion of it differs from that of the critiques of the other three in some respects. Unlike what he does with the other three, he does not start with the *prima facie* implication of idealism for immortality. Instead, he starts with the topic on which they disagree, namely, direct awareness of the external world and spends most of his time on the topic. He gets to the implications of idealism for the independence of the mind (and to materialism as an alternative to them) only right at the end of the critique. There he argues that scepticism about knowledge of things as they are, including the mind, is the only viable position and, as one would expect from his treatment of the other paralogisms, that the mind only appears as independent, which tells us nothing about what the mind is really like (A380). (This argument is the sole topic of the second-edition discussion.) Thus, only at the end of his discussion does it become clear that he is playing the same game as he was playing with the other paralogisms: Show that rationalist (or any) doctrines of the mind apply only to appearances and neither expand nor limit the possibilities for how the mind really might be.

Another way in which the critique of the fourth paralogism differs from the other three is that Kant endorses its conclusion, while rejecting that the conclusion, idealist, entails scepticism:

Even the most rigid idealist cannot require ... a proof that the object outside us (taking outside us in the strict sense [i.e., to mean 'not me']) corresponds to our perception. For if there be such an object, it could not be represented or intuited as outside us, because such representation and intuition presuppose space, and reality in space, being the reality of a mere representation, is nothing other than perception itself. ... it is impossible that in *this space* anything *outside us* (in the transcendental sense) should be given, space being nothing outside our sensibility [A375-6].

A third is that the alternative to the paralogism's conclusion, namely, empirical reason, his form of mind/world knowledge dualism, is largely irrelevant to the aim of the paralogisms, namely, to prove that immortality exists or is at least possible.

To conclude. If it appears that Kant deleted the 1st-edition critique of the fourth Paralogism and replaced it with the Refutation of Idealism in the 2nd edition, that is probably

because what should have been its topic, independence and immortality, is so secondary in the first edition, and the problem of knowledge of the external world, which is connected to the official programme of the Paralogisms chapter only indirectly, is so central. The topic of scepticism about knowledge of the external world has a high profile, so when Kant's critique of the fourth paralogism in the 1st edition is studied, it is natural that that part of it has gotten most of the attention. Indeed, we, too, will ignore everything else for the rest of this paper.

3. Interlude: How Could He?

The following argument or something like it has played a huge role in European philosophy:

If I need representations to be aware of anything, I can be immediately aware only of representations.

Let us call the consequent, 'I can be immediately aware only of representations', OR (for 'only representations'). The inference to OR is clearly not a valid inference; even if I am aware only by *having* representations, it does not follow that I am immediately aware only *of* representations; they could still make me immediately aware of things, states, events and the like other than themselves. And there are alternatives to OR. Both transparency (we are aware via representations but we are not aware of representations) and non-transparency forms of direct realism about perception are alternatives to OR. Yet many, many philosophers have accepted OR – including, as we saw, Kant:

Obviously, since what is without is not in me, I cannot encounter it ... in any perception ... I am not, therefore, in a position to *perceive* external things ... (A367-8)

What makes this unargued acceptance peculiar is that OR if true has, or certainly appears to have, disastrous implications. In particular, if one is never immediately aware of anything but states of one's own self, then one is never immediately aware of other people.

So how could Kant complacently take OR to be self-evidently true? How could it have seemed obvious to him (as it has seemed obvious to many others) that if we experience *using* representations, we can experience *only* representations. 'Encounter' in 'I cannot encounter it in any perception' is ambiguous. It can mean 'it cannot be part of any perception' or it can mean 'no perception can make me aware of it'. The latter does not follow from the former. If Kant did not notice that OR is far from obviously true, we need to ask why. One possibility is that, whatever we may think now, he did not think that much if anything hung on the issue.

Most of the time Kant took little interest in the problems of knowledge of the external world and other minds as we understand them now, certainly in the first edition. He simply took it for granted that we are aware of the external world in general and other minds in particular (another reason why the Garve/Feder review would have shocked him). His question was not

whether representations can result in truth, synthetic *a priori* truth in the case of physics, it was how this is possible (B19). In particular, how can the categorial concepts play a role?¹² That is to say, he simply took for granted in a robust, common sense way that things are pretty much as they seem to be and his task as a philosopher is merely to show how this could be so. He was so confident that we are aware of other people that he thought that only the ‘how can we do it?’ question, only the mechanism by which we gain this awareness, needs to be discussed. Here is the mechanism: “... if I wish to represent to myself a thinking being, I must put myself in his [or her] place ...” (A353-4; see also A347=B405). More particularly, when we are aware of other minds, something like the following happens. If representations make me immediately aware only of states of myself, some representations also make me aware of myself and my states in a special way: not only are they representations; they make me aware of myself as their subject. In addition (Kant never says this but seems to assume it), I am aware of myself and no other entity ‘from the inside’, from the standpoint of having, feeling, and doing experiences, feelings, and actions. If all this is so, the only way I could form a representation of a thinking being, a being “with the form of our inner sense” (A380), would be on the model of my awareness of myself, via some process of transfer. Hence, “... if I wish to represent to myself a thinking being, I must put myself in his [or her] place” At A347=B405, he says explicitly that the “transference of this consciousness of mine to other things” occurs, presumably successfully, and at A362-3 he talks in an untroubled way about others’ attitudes to my persistence as a person, which implies awareness of it.

Because Kant took it for granted that our representations do the job for us, it was natural for him to turn to questions about *how* they could do this work as the central questions of epistemology. As we just saw, that is what he did. But how could he not feel a tension between these comfortable acceptances and OR? Well, if OR is true, and Kant took it to be not just true but self-evident, then it and commonsense realism have to be compatible. Empirical realism was his attempt, or a sketch of an attempt, to knit the two together. If it was a little rough-and-ready, that wasn’t terribly important. Why not? Because Kant didn’t for a moment let OR or anything else shake his confidence that we are aware of other people and the external world in pretty much the way that we think we are. We aren’t aware of them, or at any rate cannot know if we are aware of them, as they are but we are aware of them. (I find this capacity to remain unruffled in the face of a claim that so many philosophers have taken to raise the spectre of scepticism and/or solipsism a bit awe-inspiring!)

Empirical realism is supposed to show how we can know the external world and other minds in a way that leaves transcendental idealism intact and does not collapse into transcendental realism. For this balancing act, the crucial distinction is between real existence in space, which he takes to be compatible with being contained in my representational system, and being other than me. He says that we are immediately aware of things elsewhere in space, which, he thought, is enough to answer sceptical idealism and support empirical realism (A371).¹³ And we are not aware of anything that is not ourselves or a property of ourselves – indeed the issue could not even arise (A375-6) – so OR and transcendental idealism are not threatened. Does this set of moves work?

From Kant's time to ours, commentators have puzzled over how it is even supposed to work. In its rigid adherence to OR, it is not clear how 'empirical realism' could be a form of realism at all – phenomenalism, constructivism, perspectivism, maybe, but realism?¹⁴ In particular, how is empirical realism supposed to allow for knowledge of, or even the existence of, other minds? Suppose that we could get mathematics and physics out of awareness of nothing but representations. Could we get knowledge of other minds, or other minds at all? Putnam expresses the worry nicely:

The 'methodological solipsism' holds that all our talk can be reduced to talk about experiences and logical constructions out of experiences.¹⁵ ... What makes him a *methodological* solipsist as opposed to a real solipsist is that he kindly adds that *you*, dear reader, are the 'I' of this construction when you perform it: ... *everybody* is a (methodological) solipsist.

The trouble ... is that the two stances are ludicrously incompatible. His solipsist stance implies an enormous asymmetry between persons: my body is a construction out of my experiences, ... but your body isn't a construction out of your experiences. It's a construction out of my experiences. ... My experiences are different from everyone else's ... in that they are what *everything* is constructed from. But his transcendental stance is that it's all symmetrical: the 'you' he addresses his higher-order remark to cannot be the *empirical* 'you' of the system [of experience]. But if it's really true that the 'you' of the system is the only 'you' he can *understand*, then the transcendental remark is *unintelligible*. Moral: don't be a methodological solipsist unless you are a *real* solipsist!¹⁶

Kant was a brilliant philosopher. If there is a problem here, surely he would have to have seen it!

In fact, it is not obvious that it is as difficult to fit the two together as Putnam urges. Kant certainly allowed that we can draw inferences from the content of representations to what these representations are really of. Moreover, we can check how well these inferences cohere with other inferences about the real objects of representation that I have made. I can further infer that some of my representations are of objects that themselves have representations and the ability to draw inferences from representations themselves. Kant would still have a problem of verification: How could I know which inferences to rely on, which to reject? We will take up this issue in the next section. The point I am making here is that OR is not obviously incompatible with accepting that (a lot of the time anyway) our representations are for the most part accurate. Maybe the slogan that Putnam should have pushed was, Don't be a real solipsist and don't worry about methodological solipsist!¹⁷

Whatever, while the assumption that OR is true played an important role in the development of Kant's system, cementing his idealism in place in particular, it had little impact on his view of what we can and cannot know. The main impact of OR on the critical philosophy was to generate the implausible N¹ version of the unknowability of the noumenal. At the level of Kant's confidence in his experience, OR was mostly an idle wheel. We will see another way in which that was true in the next section.

4. Truth: Perception as the Arbiter of What is Real

Near the end of the critique of the fourth paralogism, Kant introduces perception as the arbiter of what is real (A373-77).

Perception exhibits the reality of something in space; and in the absence of perception no power of imagination can invent and produce that something [A373].

Much earlier, near the beginning of the Analytic of Concepts (A58=B82ff), he introduces his view of empirical truth. These discussions make clear just how idle OR is in Kant's account. In the discussion of perception, he clearly believed that perceptions are or can be accurate and he clearly believed this in his account earlier of truth, too.

An obvious response is that, for Kant, perception exhibits the reality of something *in space* – i.e., in me. To be sure, he did believe that space is in me; if so, objects in space are intentional objects of mine. And that would fit OR just fine. However, look at what he credits perception with. He credits it with the power to do a good deal more than present my own intentional objects to me. For one thing, he uses what he takes to be a robust distinction between imagination and veridical perception: perception is the arbiter of which objects exist and which are imaginary. If our awareness of something is not via perceiving it but via imagining it, hallucinating it, dreaming, becoming aware of as a result of sense-deception (A376), or the like, the object of our experience is not real. The trouble is, there is no good way to get this distinction out of an OR-based picture of perception, even if the power to infer to non-self objects is coupled to it. His theory of space illustrates the problem. When he says that perception exhibits reality, he means ... reality, not just the perceiver's intentional objects. But he also holds that space is a property of the perceiver. How can he hold both views?

And hold both views he does. The contents of perception but not imagination are somehow controlled by objects other than the imaginative, synthesizing mind. Now the problem takes this form, though Kant seems never to have faced it: How could this control happen? Indeed, he has little by way of resources with which even to face it. If the objects of perception gain even spatial location only by being a property of the mind, how could anything not part of the mind have any influence whatsoever on the contents of any perception? According to Kant, perceptions have objects resistant to mental manipulation, objects to which we are passive. The rest are imaginings and the like. From whence could perceptions become thus resistant?¹⁸

In the Analytic, Kant never discussed from whence the resistance could come, so far as I have discovered. Kant held a correspondence theory of truth (A58=B82ff). Trouble is, the correspondence that determines truth, he tells us, is the one that relates belief or theory to perceptions (judgments and appearances), not perceptions to how things are. On either doctrine of noumena, we cannot assess this relation directly. If so, how *could* we know which

‘perceptions’ present the actual and which are mere imaginings? And what from the not-self could control the content of some representations?

Here in the Dialectic he does at least sidle up to it. However, his proposal is pretty lame. He suggests that “whatever is connected with a perception according to empirical laws is actual” (A376; see *Prolegomena* IV:290-1 and 336). What makes this lame is that it says nothing about how the original perception got its warrant. A delusional fantasy of a cognitively distressed person might hang together nicely according to empirical laws, yet depict nothing actual. (This is the standard problem facing coherence accounts of truth or justification.) So Kant did not solve the problem. But that does not imply that he did not hold that perceptions do more for us epistemically than they could do if OR and the attendant empirical realism were true. It is hard to see why Kant stuck with OR so tenaciously and unreflectively.

Indeed, we can now show in another way that OR is largely idle so far as Kant’s view of what we can know is concerned. If perceptions present reality, the actual, what happens to the idea that I am not aware of anything other than myself? What happens is that the idea of an unknowable transcendental object *has been emptied*. If perceptions present reality, they have to be presenting properties of things other than me in the normal sense, not just my own intentional objects (the kind of perception needs to be specified; we can also have perceptions of ourselves). By ‘perception of an object’ we just do not mean merely ‘awareness of an intentional object located in a representation of space’. That is true of many dreams. We mean ‘immediate awareness of something real’ – something whose *esse* is not *percipi*, something that is not a property of myself, something that in some cases could have a point of view of its own. When Kant accepts that perceptions present real objects, what then is left over to anchor the sense of ‘being something other than me’ in the *transcendental* sense? On the N² account, the permanent possibility that even the most careful perception and theorizing might still get things wrong. On the N¹ account, ... almost nothing. Only the belief that even perceived objects in space are still “in us” sustains the latter account (A373; see A375-6).

5. Transcendental Idealism and the God’s-eye Point of View

One way to think about transcendental idealism is to view it as built on resistance to the idea that we can occupy a God’s-eye point of view. The only way to view myself and my knowledge is from my point of view because I can have no other point of view. Moreover, even if somehow I occupy an objective point of view, symmetrical with respect to all possible objects of awareness, I would have to start from and built it on my unique, asymmetrical point of view on myself and the world. Any idea that there could be a symmetrical view of the world that is more than that would be an illusion. Even a God would have a point of view.

This position has become the credo of an important group of recent philosophers. It is mostly ignored by another. Nagel and B. Williams are members of the former, Williams in particular.¹⁹ Accepting as he does that all knowledge is from a point of view, he nevertheless

attempts to make sense of something that would do the job of the symmetrical, God's-eye point of view. He calls it the absolute conception. It is a careful attempt to co-ordinate perspectives under the guiding light of some general principles of reason and scientific theory. Putnam is another member of this group. Among the more unflinching members of the other group are the Churchlands, for whom considerations of point of view, especially the difference between a mind's point of view on itself and the point of view of others on it, hardly exist.

Though Kant did not try to co-ordinate our point of view on ourselves with any objective point of view, he tended to reside in the former. Here is one particularly interesting passage. Talking about how transcendental idealism pulls the teeth of materialism, he says

by this teaching so completely are we freed from the fear that on the removal of matter all thought ... would be destroyed, that on the contrary it is clearly shown, that if I remove the thinking subject the whole corporeal world must at once vanish: it is nothing save an appearance ... [A383].²⁰

Indeed, where point of view is evident in Kant's work, he is nearly always in the asymmetric, first person point of view. A striking example. For him, the mind/body problem is just this: "*how in a thinking subject outer intuition, namely, that of space, with its filling-in of shape and motion [in the form of my body], is possible*" (A393, emphasis in original), how, that is to say, within my representation of myself to myself, representation of myself as a mid-sized, spatial, moving object is possible.

Suppose that I am right here, that Kant felt that knowledge should be studied from the point of view of the knower, suppose also that a sense of this (never clearly articulated, to be sure) was behind his transcendental idealism, and suppose even that Kant thought that somehow our dependence on representations entails that we should study knowledge from the point of view of the representing knower. It is not clear that even all of this would lend any support to OR. It is one thing to say that *only representations make me aware*, it is quite another to say that I am *aware only of representations (OR)*. Once again, Kant could have given up the latter view without cost to the critical philosophy. Wittgenstein said that the world is my world. Kant argued that I am my world. There is a profound difference between the two positions.²¹

6. The Refutation of Idealism

We have seen that Kant had little reason to adhere to OR and could have given it up without cost and even with gains, in the form of tidier theories and fewer conceptual tangles. He never seems to have done so explicitly. However, OR being both so awkward and so idle, it would not be surprising to find other things breaking through in his thought if the occasion was right. That seems to me to be just what happened in the Refutation of Idealism. Suddenly Kant is claiming that we must be aware of "an external thing distinct from all my representations ..." (Bxli), of "the existence of [not just] things outside me [but of] other things" (B276). Neither claim seems

to be consistent with OR, though there is little evidence that Kant saw this.

How do the topics and claims of the Refutation of Idealism just identified connect to the fourth Paralogism? Here is one plausible suggestion. The attack on the fourth Paralogism in the first edition is really about two things, as we said in Section 2. One is the official topic, independent existence and immortality. The other is scepticism about knowledge of the external world (in the sense of ‘external’ that means ‘not me’). For the second edition, Kant separated these topics. He continued to discuss independent existence and immortality, the topics proper to the Paralogisms, in the chapter on the Paralogisms and he moved scepticism to the new Refutation of Idealism. Kant might have had two reasons for relocating the latter to the Analytic. The new Refutation of Idealism does what Kant says in the fourth Paralogism (A377) that he will do in the Antinomies but in the end never does in the first edition, namely, undercut dogmatic idealism, the view that nothing exists but me and my representational states. (As we said earlier, all he does in the Antinomies is to show that the concept of matter is not self-contradictory.) As Guyer argues, this argument would complete the objective deduction, providing Kant with perhaps his only successful strategy for defending a realist, i.e., non-inferentialist, account of knowledge of things other than oneself.²² Secondly, due to the Garve/Feder review mentioned earlier and other commentaries like it in which Kant was accused of Berkeleyan scepticism and subjectivism, the whole issue of sceptical idealism had become very pressing for him.²³ Nor is sceptical idealism the only example of Kant moving a topic from the Paralogisms chapter in the 1st edition to the Analytic for the 2nd edition. He also moved self-awareness from the critique of the second paralogism to the Transcendental Deduction.

Moreover, and this has not often been noted, scepticism, what Kant calls sceptical idealism, being the topic of the Refutation, he had a good reason to put the new passage in the middle of the Postulates of Empirical Thought. Once the spectre of scepticism and/or solipsism is raised, the concepts of possibility, actuality and necessary become quite tricky. If I cannot know of any actuality beyond myself and my representations, what could the difference between possibility and actuality concerning things other than myself amount to? And what content could the notion of necessity have here? The placement is far from arbitrary.

The central argument of the Refutation of Idealism runs as follows.²⁴ First, “I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time” (B275). What he means by “determined in time” is unclear in the Refutation, but gets clarified in the long footnote in the Preface. He means that I can apply the apparatus of existence in time to myself. This I can clearly do: I recognize earlier and later stages of myself, compare the time of events in me to other events, locate myself in time, and so on.

Second, I do not represent myself in time on the basis of anything represented to me about myself. When I am aware of myself as subject of experience, determinations of time are not represented at all. This form of self-awareness is

a merely *intellectual* representation of the spontaneity of the thinking subject.²⁵ This ‘I’

has not, therefore the least predicate of intuition, which as permanent, might serve as correlate for the determination of time in inner sense – in the manner in which, for instance, *impenetrability* serves in our *empirical* intuition of matter [B278].

This is the old doctrine that *awareness* of self as subject need not give us *knowledge* of it (see A355 in the 1st-edition critique of the second paralogism and B158 in the 2nd-edition Deduction). Here Kant emphasizes knowledge of temporal dimensions. It is also a development of Kant's point against the third paralogism that awareness of earlier subjects in memory is not knowledge that one has persisted, not even if the memories are from the point of view of the earlier subject.²⁶ Thus, if I am going to determine my own existence in time, I must do it via the contents of sensible intuition. Temporal apparatus can be applied only to intuitions, to something that has a manifold, a multiplicity of items (Bxl). For me to be able to apply temporal apparatus to myself, therefore, I must do so via applying it to intuitions. For this, not just any old intuitions will do; mere multiplicity is not enough. To apply temporal apparatus, we must also be able to identify change. To identify change, however, we must be able to identify something that persists through the change – we must be able to identify something permanent. Thus, awareness of the contents of inner sense could do no better with time than awareness of myself as subject.

Third, and this is a key move, *by themselves and cut off from things other than oneself* (Bxxxix fn.), neither representations nor anything represented in a representation could do any more by way of representing the permanence of oneself.

... the representation of [something permanent] may be very transitory and variable like all our other representations, not excepting those of matter, it yet refers to something permanent. The latter must therefore be an external thing *distinct from all my representations* ... [Bxli; my emphasis].

Our representations are constantly changing; indeed, they cease altogether for a number of hours each night. Therefore, the representation of permanence cannot consist in anything permanent in representations.

Instead, fourth, we must somehow *extract* something from the objects of various representations that we can treat as a representation of a persisting object. If such objects were merely properties of myself, however, they would not have any permanence either. Therefore, an object could be represented as permanent only if it is “an external thing distinct from all my representations”(Bxli). Therefore, I must be aware of something that is neither a representation nor myself. “In other words, the consciousness of my existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me” (B276). At least some of the intentional objects of my representations must present me with real, independently-existing objects. QED. And Kant now seems to be advocating some form of direct realism about perceptual knowledge.

In my reconstruction, I have combined passages from the Refutation with passages from

the long footnote on the Refutation that Kant appended to the second-edition Preface. He was not happy with some details of the Refutation as it stood and asked that certain passages from the footnote be substituted. I have followed his recommendations. Note too that everything in the Refutation draws on Kant's conclusion in his attack on the third paralogism that unified consciousness which unifies memories of earlier events done and felt and had with current experiences from the same point of view reveals, or need reveal, little by way of the self's duration. Furthermore, what he means by 'permanence' is not very clear. Does he mean simply persisting through change or does he mean something more, something not changing at all? Here this question is not important; simple persistence will do. (In connection with the first Analogy, however, this is a significant question.²⁷)

The individual nuts and bolts of the argument of the Refutation are not unique to the 2nd edition. Only the location, assembly, and detailed working-out is new. Immediately after the discussion of the fourth Paralogism, in the very first sentences of his remarks about the Paralogisms as a whole, Kant says this:

... the appearance to outer sense has something fixed or abiding which supplies a substratum to its transitory determinations ..., whereas time, which is the sole form of our inner intuition, has nothing abiding and therefore yields knowledge only of ... change ..., not of any object that can be thereby determined. For in what we entitle 'soul' everything is in continual flux and there is nothing abiding except ... the 'I', which ... has no content, and therefore no manifold ... [A381]²⁸.

Kant's argument for the first Analogy, the Principle of Permanence of Substance, is also similar to the argument of the Refutation. Likewise, the argument-structure of the Refutation is broadly parallel to the argument-structure of A108 and B134. They all start from self-awareness, though, as Allison points out,²⁹ the Refutation starts from empirical awareness of myself as determined in time, not transcendental awareness of myself as myself; the fundamental idea is that I could appear to myself as I do only if representations of myself also have other characteristics. In the case of the Refutation, "consciousness of my existence is bound up by way of identity (*identisch verbunden*)³⁰ with the consciousness of ... something outside me" (Bx1). In addition to the difference that Allison points out, the other main difference is in the conclusions of the arguments. The Refutation argues that representations must represent genuinely external objects, whereas the Deduction argues that their objects must be tied together under the categories, and specifically under the concept of cause. These parallels are important because they indicate that any new ideas that appear in the Refutation were not so far away in the 1st edition either, in however much tension with other things going on in the 1st edition they may be.³¹

7. Realism and 'Empirical Realism'

Is there anything to the argument of the Refutation? It is hard to be sure but I think that there is, certainly on the account he gives of the 'manifoldlessness' of awareness of oneself as subject

(A355, B158 and elsewhere). There isn't much in this awareness that could ground judgments of identity, as Kant showed in his critique of the third paralogism, so there isn't much that could ground judgments of permanence either. 'What about memories of one's earlier experiences, feelings, and actions?' Alas, Kant does not talk about memory here, even though he had done so in the 1st-edition critique of the third paralogism, as we noted in the previous section, so who knows? Nonetheless, in the light of current claims about cognition necessarily being embodied, finding an argument from 200 years ago that one could be aware of oneself as persisting only if one is part of, and is aware of oneself as part of, a world of persisting objects, is appealing. In this paper, however, I don't want to focus on the Refutation's merits. I want to focus on its realist conclusion.

Given that Kant did not abandon OR or the N¹ unknowability of the noumenal in the 2nd edition (the extensive changes he made to the chapter on phenomena and noumena notwithstanding), what are we to make of the new realism? Both of the old doctrines were very important to him, the unknowability of the noumena in particular. Can having "immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me", of "an external thing distinct from all my representations", be squared with either doctrine?

Kant's new view has two parts: A new concept of what a real object that we know is like and a new account of our awareness of objects. Real object: Unlike what he did in his discussion of the fourth paralogism, Kant now deeply distinguishes objects of representation and the object represented; the latter now have properties quite different from the properties of objects of representation. In most of *CPR*, the distinction between 'real objects independent of our representations' and 'intentional objects whose existence depends on our representations and which may be merely intentional' depends merely on our passivity to, and the greater causal integration of, the former. In the Refutation, he gives it some real strength.

Awareness of objects: The more drastic change is in Kant's views on our immediate awareness of objects other than ourselves. In both the Refutation and the long footnote, Kant does not always say that we must have immediate awareness of things other than ourselves – for example, in the footnote he says that we must have "consciousness of a *relation* to something outside me". However, sometimes he says so and very clearly: "the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of actual things *which I perceive outside me*" (B275-6, my emphases in all cases). Or, we must have "an immediate consciousness of *the existence* of other things outside me" (B276). Nor does he mean 'outside' only in the empirical sense here; on B276, he talks explicitly of consciousness of "other things" and Bxli of "an external thing distinct from all my representations". So Kant does say that one is immediately aware of things other than oneself, though he says (a few) other things, too.

With this change goes a change in the doctrine of matter. In the first edition, Kant distinguished between matter as a feature of appearances – a feature that consists of the objects of these appearances having extension, impenetrability, cohesion, and motion (A358) – and contrasted it with things as they actually are (A268=B324).

Matter is with [the transcendental idealist], therefore, only a species of representations (intuition), which are called external, not as standing in relation to objects *in themselves external*, but because they relate perceptions to the space in which all things are external to one another, while yet the space itself is in us [A370].

What matter really is, what “inwardly belongs to it” (A277=B333; I will not go into what Kant meant by this Leibnizian term ‘inward’), is hidden. All I can be aware of are its outer relations, its effects on my representations. This is full N¹ unknowability of the noumenal. In the Refutation, something very interesting happens to this doctrine of matter as a property of appearances. Having argued that we must have immediate awareness of something *other than ourselves* that is permanent, Kant says in Note 2 that “... we have nothing permanent ... save only *matter*” (B278, his emphasis). He gives objects on the earth as an example of the permanent, saying that we can see the sun move by comparing it to their permanence. If so, matter includes the good old matter of the sun and the earth. To our great frustration, that is all he says, but that is enough to indicate that Kant at least advanced the idea here that matter is independent of us.³²

Given what Kant now says about matter, he could not continue to hold that space (and time) have no extra-mental existence, though he may well not have seen this. He could retain the idea that we impose a spatial matrix but there would now be no reason to say that things as they are could not have the spatial properties that we represent them as having. If I am right about this, that and the new realism about awareness of permanent objects would some evidence that Kant is now moving toward something more like the N² notion of the unknowability of the noumenal: Things as they are may have the intuitional, quantitative, qualitative, etc., properties that we ascribe to them, we just cannot be sure. If so, the treasured empirical realist distinction of the first edition between being external to me in space (a state compatible with being a property of me) and being an entity other than me would lose its point.

A claim that one is immediately aware of things other than oneself and one’s states is inconsistent with OR and N¹ unknowability, so it is interesting to see what commentators have done with the issue. Consider Allison and Guyer. Allison construes Kant’s claims about ‘other things outside me’ as falling entirely within the ambit of OR and N¹ transcendental idealism.³³ Guyer takes Kant’s new realist inclinations more seriously. However, despite quoting him as saying that we have an “intellectual intuition” of “other things outside me” which is “not a mere representation of them in space” (i.e. not intuitional), even Guyer does not suggest that Kant says anything that would contradict OR.³⁴ Instead, Guyer suggests, Kant was claiming that we must *presuppose*, in our representational constructions, “that there are external objects” (he means objects other than oneself), but Kant continued to maintain that representations never present the objects being presupposed.³⁵ Guyer offers no reason to ascribe such a curious, convoluted view to Kant. It seems that neither he nor Allison could entertain the idea that what Kant says in the Refutation simply contradicts OR and the N¹ doctrine of the unknowability of the noumenal. This is strange; the new ideas are much more plausible on their face than the old ones were.

Well, Kant did say things here that contradict OR. I think that there can be little doubt

about that. To go back to a distinction made earlier (Section 3), he is now allowing that, in the epistemic sense, we *can* encounter things other than ourselves via representations. However, the situation with respect to the unknowability of the noumenal is more complicated. First, the new claims of the Refutation are not incompatible with the N² construal of the unknowability doctrine. But the situation is not perfectly clear even on the N¹ construal. Though it has been little remarked upon in the literature, Kant distinguished being aware of something from having knowledge of it. The distinction allowed him in the new Deduction to accept that we are immediately consciousness of ourselves as we are without having to allow that we know anything about ourselves (B158).³⁶ The same distinction could very well be at work in the Refutation, written at about the same time. Note Kant's careful wording: I have an "immediate consciousness of the *existence* of other things outside me" (B276, my emphasis). He does not say that we have any knowledge of them. Kant uses the same careful wording in the footnote: "I am conscious of *my existence* in time ..." (Bx1, my emphasis). This is "more than to be conscious merely of my representations" (Bx1) but may be less than knowledge. If Kant is relying on the same 'bare consciousness' that is not knowledge of things other than myself that he introduced in connection with one's self in the new Deduction, the Refutation would be no more serious an exception to the unknowability of the noumenal than the bare consciousness of self was.

However, the new claims would be inconsistent with the two-world picture of phenomena and noumena and the N¹ picture of unknowability. If we are immediately aware of the world as it is, the idea that the world as it is never appears in our representations, that we are aware only of our own representations, would have to go. It seems to me that there is movement in Kant's thought in just such a direction, movement, that is to say, from N¹ to N². It is too bad that he never thought the matter through properly.

'Surely,' it will be objected, 'it is highly anachronistic to ascribe to Kant any notion of a kind of reference that needs no ascription of properties.' It is not. He clearly articulated just such a notion. His name for it was "transcendental designation" (A355) – we refer while "noting no qualities" in, i.e., ascribing nothing to, the object to which we are referring. The idea appears in the 2nd edition, too, for example at B158. Once such an act of non-ascriptive reference is made, for Kant it would immediately be surrounded by an 'umbra' of cognitive manipulations: the undescribed object to which reference has been made would be judged, described, propositional attitudes would be taken up to it, theories could be formed about it, and so on. Moreover, these, the realm of knowledge, could remain properties only of our representations. But nothing in Kant's constructivist picture of conceptual knowledge rules out the possibility of reference without knowledge.

Moreover, for Kant awareness of self and awareness of things other than self is symmetrical. If he postulated a form of reference to self that requires no ascription in the new Deduction, he may well have thought we can make a similar form of reference to objects other than the self in the new Refutation. The reading of the Refutation that I am suggesting would preserve this symmetry. In both cases, our acts of reference would refer to and thus make us aware of the objects themselves, not just representations of them, but in both cases these acts of

reference need give us no knowledge of the things to which we thus refer. Of oneself these acts would yield a “bare consciousness” that is “very far from being a knowledge of the self” (B158; see A346=B404). Of things other than oneself, they would yield “an immediate awareness of the existence of other things outside me” (B276) that would be equally far from being a knowledge of them.

The distinction between being aware of something and having knowledge of it is supported by an important theory of reference. Here reference can ‘reach’ all the way to its object, yet description remain an act of constructive concept-application, even to the point of the constructor not being able to know whether its constructions are ever accurate – reference could reach a real object, free of potentially distorting judgment or description, à la Kripke, Kaplan and Evans, and yet leave all possible room for description to be ‘theory-laden’ and otherwise influenced by the cognitive apparatus of the mind doing the describing.

This picture of reference is quite different from the picture standard in Anglo-American philosophy until recently, where reference to something is always under a description. However, Kant's picture or something like it is central to the work of Putnam, Kripke, Evans, Kaplan, and even the later Wittgenstein. (I include the later Wittgenstein because of the central role that paradigm cases play in his picture.)

In one respect, the Refutation goes further with knowledge of things as they are than the 2nd-edition Deduction and even N² does. In the Refutation, we are not just aware of objects other than ourselves, we have one piece of knowledge about them: that they are permanent, some of them anyway, and in some sense of ‘permanent’. This means that on this one point, our beliefs about things are more than just inferences from what we find in our representations. Our beliefs actually represent the world as it is. If so, here and on this one point, Kant has gone beyond even the N² construal of unknowability. (The same would be true if we know that certain other beings are persons, have an inner sense like ours (A380).) Nevertheless, even here, Kant could cogently insist, we never have any immediate, undoctored awareness of things’ other properties and so can never know whether any other belief about them is true.

8. Persisting Ambivalences

Where does this leave us with OR and N¹ unknowability? It is hard to avoid the conclusion, I am afraid, that the Refutation just does contradict these doctrines. That should have been a problem for Kant. On the one hand, he took OR to be self-evident (a mistake that many, many others have made). On the other, he had a robust confidence that we have some sort of immediate awareness of at least some things other than ourselves – the sun, objects on earth, other people. He should have seen that something needed to be reconciled here but it is not clear that he did.

Indeed, at least four pieces of double-mindedness ground away in Kant on these topics in the critical period:

1. Awareness of the real as built out of properties of my representations (OR) and as awareness of things other than me.
2. The N¹ construal of the unknowability of the noumenal based on OR and the N² construal.
3. External as in space but still in me ('empirically external') and as other than me (external in the 'transcendental' sense) (A373).
4. Matter as a property of, or postulate to explain, patterns in objects of representation (appearances) and as something other than me.

I am not sure that Kant ever reached an unambivalent resting place on any of them. He expressed quite remarkable unease in both the Refutation and the long footnote. After proving to his own satisfaction in the Refutation that we must be immediately aware of things other than ourselves, Kant goes on, "be the possibility of this consciousness understood by us or not" (B276fn.). We find a similarly resigned remark at the end of the long footnote: We are as little capable of explaining how "an external thing distinct from all my representations" could be part of the single experience that determines my existence in time as we are "of accounting for our ability to think the abiding in time" (Bxli). Nevertheless, I think that there was movement in Kant's thinking. On all four issues, in places in the 2nd edition he got closer to views that we would find plausible now than the 1st edition did.

ENDNOTES

1. Guyer, Paul, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 282. Guyer documents the trend to realism in the Refutation in Chapters 12 and 14.
2. Brook, Andrew, *Kant and the Mind*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, Chapter 10.
3. In addition to our awareness of things other than ourselves, these texts deal with other topics, too, especially the critique of the fourth paralogism. Indeed, the official topic of that passage is not knowledge of the external world at all. It is whether the mind is (ontologically) *independent* of things other than itself, a crucial question in the context of immortality. Thus the mind/body problem is very much part of the discussion. In addition, the passage raises real problems for our knowledge of other minds; so what little we can glean of Kant's attitude to this question has to be related to what he says here. The other passage, the Refutation, makes some important remarks about our awareness of our own persistence.
4. References to Kant are to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, 1st edition 1781, 2nd edition 1787, unless otherwise noted. I will use the Norman Kemp Smith translation, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, London: Macmillan, 1926. I have checked translations for accuracy and modified them where appropriate. The quoted passage is at the beginning of Kant's commentary on the fourth Paralogism. Kemp Smith emends the sentence which begins the passage by adding 'it is argued'. The passage could merely be presenting his opponents' view, not Kant's own, but this

emendation makes it look far more certain that he is merely doing that than the context warrants. In general, Kant accepted the premises of Paralogisms and he certainly accepted part of the argument for the fourth paralogism made here. What follows in the passage makes this clear.

5. Kant, I., *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798), trans. Mary Gregor. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974. The numerals are the pagination of the Akademie-Ausgabe edition, volume VII.

6. As we will see in the final section, for Kant these views go with, maybe require, a very interesting distinction between what we would now call reference and description.

7. In addition, as Kant points out in the *Prolegomena* (IV: 123), idealism of the sort that he is attacking here is itself related to rationalism. Both deny that sensible experience gives us knowledge of the world. *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (1783), trans. P. Carus, rev. with intro. by James Ellington, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishers, 1977.

8. Oliver Thorndike drew this point about dualism to my attention in an email conversation.

9. A more cautious argument reaching the same conclusion would have been that we know no more about the ideality or materiality or any other property of representations themselves or of the ground of our representations than we know about anything else as it is. I discuss the issue further in *Kant and the Mind*, chapter 9:5.

10. The argument of the fourth paralogism could not have been intended as a full argument for immortality. The most either it or its dualistic opponent could aim to show is that immortality is possible; the most it could establish would be a necessary condition of immortality. But that is all the second paralogism could have done either. If the soul is simple, it would not follow that immortality is true. All that would follow is that nothing about the composition of the soul rules immortality out. The same is not true of the third.

11. He says (A377) that the full argument against dogmatic idealism will come in the chapter on the Antinomies but all he does there is to show that the existence of things not myself is possible because the concept of matter is not self-contradictory. This puzzling comment on the Antinomies chapter becomes even more puzzling when we learn that the chapter on the Paralogisms was written after the chapter on the Antinomies was in close to its final form.

12. There is a similar lack of concern about traditional sceptical problems about knowledge in contemporary cognitive science. My reading of Kant here is completely contrary to the standard English-language reading inspired by Strawson. I provide justification for my reading in *ibid.*, Chapter 5.

13. Actually, being real in space is not enough by itself to support empirical realism. Location at a point in space other than the point I occupy is also needed. However, for this notion to have sense, I must be able to identify myself as subject with some being that occupies a point in space – an issue about which Kant merely waves his hands, even in the 2nd edition (B155). In the

critique of the fourth paralogism Kant deftly skirts this issue by talking about ‘things which are to be found in space’ (A373) and avoiding any mention of location, of *where* in space.

14. Putnam claims that Kant’s view is a precursor of his ‘internal realism’ but it is not clear to what extent this ‘realism’ is a form of realism, either (*Realism and Reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). However, that is an issue for another time.

15. I am not sure ‘methodological solipsist’ is the term that Putnam wants here. Methodological solipsism is the view that the mind can be studied without reference to its connections to its world, and need take no stand on what representations make us aware of. ‘Phenomenalist’ or, a term even more apt for Kant, ‘constructivist’ would be more appropriate terms.

16. “Why Reason Can’t be Naturalized”, in *ibid.*, pp. 236-7.

17. I am not claiming that we can resolve all the puzzles about empirical realism, just this one. In particular, there would still be a big problem about whether my inferential reading of empirical realism could be made compatible with the N¹ reading of the unknowability of things as they are.

18. I discuss this issue in A. Brook, Critical Notice of L. Falkenstein, *Kant's Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic*. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 29, 1998, pp. 247-68.

19. Thomas Nagel, *The View from Nowhere* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 138-140.

20. This passage is interesting for another reason. Even if one retained the idea that removal of matter out of which one is made would be the end of me, one would, or could, agree with Kant that the removal of me would end matter – for me. The interest lies in the question, How do these two propositions relate to one another?

21. I owe this nice way of making the distinction to Richard Devidi.

22. For reasons identified in the second paragraph of this paper, I am not sure that the account that Guyer gives of what is going on in the Refutation is entirely correct in some other respects.

23. For an excellent discussion of Kant’s relationship to empiricists in general, see Brigitte Sassen, trans. and ed., *Kant's Early Critics: The Empiricist Critique of the Theoretical Philosophy*. Cambridge and New York : Cambridge University Press, 2000.

24. The clearest and most accurate account of the structure of the Refutation that I know of is Allison’s (Henry Alison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense*. New Haven CN: Yale University Press, 1983, Ch. 14). My summary of the argument is generally in accord with his. As we will see, he does underplay one crucial issue.

25. 'Intellectual' representation and intuition were Kant's terms for non-sensible but nevertheless direct epistemic contact with something. In the Appendix on the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection and elsewhere he says or implies that if we were aware of things as they are, this awareness would be intellectual intuition. For another example, see the passages from *Reflexion* 5653, Ak. XVIII:306 quoted below.

26. I discuss the critique of the second paralogism in Ch. 7 of *op. cit.* and of the third in Ch. 8.

27. As Jonathan Bennett has noted (*Kant's Analytic*. Cambridge University Press, 1966, Sections 45 and 50). *How* representations could thus tell me, what could be extracted from them to give us this information, is also a question. We touched on a different version of it two sections ago.

28. Note that by Kant's argument in the Refutation, time and inner sense in general should not be able to yield even knowledge of change.

29. *op. cit.*, p. 296.

30. In the precritical writings and sometimes in *CPR*, by 'identity' Kant meant semantic inclusion, one thing entailing another.

31. Guyer, *op. cit.*, Part IV, has done a thorough study of pre- and post-cursors of the Refutation. See especially Ch. 13.

32. For Kant, the concept of matter is extremely important; together with mathematics, it is the heart of modern science. His views on the topic are mind-bogglingly complicated. He manages to treat matter as both the stuff of individual objects ("objects on the earth" is his example on B278) and as an Aristotelian, sempiternal substrate shared by all and the same in all. He thought that to reason about matter we must employ elaborate, *a priori* Axioms, Anticipations, Analogies and Postulates. The concept of matter was prone, as he saw it, to generating Antinomies. And this just scratches the surface. Kant wrote an entire additional work on the subject a few years later, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (1786) (Ak. IV).

33. Alison, *op. cit.*, pp. 300, 304.

34. All the quotations in this sentence are from *Reflexion* 5653, Ak. XVIII:306.

35. Guyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 327-8

36. I explore all this in Brook, *op. cit.*, Ch. 10.

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