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DESCRIPTION-NAMES

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ABSTRACT. It is argued that, contrary to appearances, description-names (e.g.: “The Roman Empire”, “The Beatles”, “The Holy Virgin”, . . .) do conform to Millianism, i.e. the view that proper names are directly referential expressions, referring regardless of whether the relevant individual satisfies some associated description or not. However, description-names name *and* describe. Some arguments supporting this peculiarity and a logic to handle description-names are proposed. It will be shown that the best framework with which to accommodate description-names is a multiple-proposition theory, according to which a given utterance may express several propositions.

KEY WORDS: descriptions, millianism, multiple-propositions theory, proper names

1. THE PROBLEM

There is a category of noun phrases such as ‘The Holy Roman Empire’, ‘The Morning Star’, ‘The Holy Virgin’, ‘The Rolling Stones’, etc. that has hitherto received little discussion. I call such noun phrases *description-names*: expressions that look like descriptions, but work like proper names. In *written* English, we mark this fact using capital letters. In spoken English, however, the distinction between a description like ‘the rolling stones’ and the description-name ‘The Rolling Stones’ is usually contextually marked. In a spoken utterance of “The rolling stones from the hill killed many invaders”, the context marks ‘the rolling stones’ as a description, whilst in a spoken utterance of “The Rolling Stones arrived last night and they’ll perform tonight”, it is likely to be a description-name.

Description-names should be distinguished from *descriptive* names, which are names introduced into the language *in connection* with some description. They do not usually look like descriptions. A classic example is ‘Jack the Ripper’, which was introduced to refer to whoever committed the relevant crimes (see Kripke, 1980); the same can be said about ‘Julius’ *qua* name for whoever invented the zip (see Evans 1982). With descriptive names, reference is fixed by stipulation; the referent is the individual who happens to satisfy the associated description. The name may turn out to be empty (as was the case with ‘Vulcan’, introduced by LeVerrier to refer to the alleged planet perturbing the orbit of Mercury).¹



With description-names, however, the story is rather different, for reference is not fixed by stipulation. Instead, when a description is elected as a proper name, the description-name thus created refers without the mediation of the description, even though the referent may be believed to have some or all of the characteristics attributed by the description. It may even be the case that the description embodied in the name turns out to be a false description of the referent. Some descriptions have been elected to the role of proper names because the referents were thought to satisfy a certain description, e.g. 'The Evening Star' referring to Venus because it appears in the evening,² 'The Holy Virgin' referring to Mary insofar as she gave birth to Jesus whilst a virgin, or so the story goes. Other description-names, e.g. 'The Rolling Stones', 'The Sharks', 'The Yankees', 'The Red Devils', etc., are introduced in electing a description to the role of a proper name due to variegated situations or intents: The Rolling Stones are not stones and Manchester United players are neither red nor devils. Nonetheless, in these cases the description still plays a role, for it *connotes* or purports to connote some information; for example, the descriptive content of 'The Red Devils' is a metaphor for team's spirit. Because of the encapsulated description, description-names may be thought to pose a threat to Millianism, i.e. the thesis that a proper name refers *directly* to an object, regardless of the latter possessing determinate characteristics and satisfying determinate descriptions. Following this view, a proper name is like a tag; it is merely a label we use to single out an object of discourse. This particular thesis seems to face difficulties in accommodating (at least some) description-names. 'The Holy Virgin', for instance, appears to designate its particular referent because of certain properties she satisfies. An attack against Millianism, then, might proceed by citing description-names in favour of an opposing view, i.e. a view that considers proper names to refer in virtue of conditions a referent must satisfy.

In what follows, I shall defend a Millian theory of description-names. This may not sound novel, for Mill himself claimed that 'Dartmouth' would refer to Dartmouth even if the mouth of the Dart changed its location – or even if Dartmouth had never been located near the Dart's mouth. What is novel in my account is the way in which I shall motivate and justify Millianism regarding description-names, for I shall vindicate Millianism about description-names focusing on the way definite descriptions work. I distinguish three uses of definite descriptions: on top of Donnellan's now famous distinction between referential and attributive uses, I shall recognize description-names. The thesis I defend is, roughly put, that a noun phrase of the form 'the *F*' can be interpreted either (i) as a quantified expression, (ii) as a complex demonstrative or (iii) as a proper name.

I shall, then, defend the following naïve view: (i) names name, (ii) descriptions describe, and (iii) description-names name *and* describe, yet the utterances containing them do not necessarily express incompatible truth conditions.

2. DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS

Russell, unlike Frege, championed the view that definite descriptions are not singular terms. Thus, a sentence such as:

(1) a The present king of France is bald

is not, contrary to appearances, of the subject/predicate form, Fa , but is instead an abbreviation of:

(1) b At least one thing is King of France, at most one thing is King of France and everything that is King of France is bald

Using first-order logic, this can be represented as either (1c) or (1d), where ‘ F ’ stands for King of France and ‘ G ’ for being bald:

(1) c $(\exists x)(Fx \ \& \ (y)(Fy \rightarrow x = y) \ \& \ Gx)$,
 d $(\exists x)((y)(Fy \leftrightarrow x = y) \ \& \ Gx)$.

Donnellan (1966) challenged the Russellian analysis and argued that sometimes descriptions do not work in the way Russell suggested. Donnellan invites us to consider the following scenario: Sue, on discovering Smith’s body, which has been savagely mutilated, claims, “The murderer of Smith is insane”. Sue has no specific individual in mind and thus her use of the description works the way Russell told us. Sue’s claim is short for: “The murderer of Smith, whoever s/he is, is insane”, for she uses the description *attributively*. At the trial, Sue, looking at John (who is alleged to be Smith’s murderer and who behaves in a rather strange way), says: “*The* murderer of Smith is insane”. Sue’s claim is aimed *at John* and the description does not seem to work the way Russell suggested, for Sue’s utterance goes proxy for “*That* murderer of Smith is insane”. If Sue had uttered the latter she would have said the same thing and passed to her audience the very same information. In that case, the description is used *referentially* and works like a singular term:

[T]he description is here [in the referential use] merely a device for getting one’s audience to pick out or think of the thing to be spoken about, a device which may serve its function even if the description is incorrect. More importantly, perhaps, in the referential use as opposed to the attributive, there is a right thing to be picked out by the audience, and its being the right thing is not simply a function of its fitting the description. (Donnellan, 1966, p. 303)

Kaplan (1978), like Donnellan, takes a description used referentially to be a singular term and suggests that it works like a demonstrative. Kaplan (1978, p. 23) introduces “a *new* word, ‘dthat’ for the demonstrative use of ‘that’” and argues that the referential use of the description can be regimented as: DTHAT [the murderer of Smith]. Kaplan claims that ‘dthat’ can be used to make any description *both* a singular term and a rigid designator, i.e. a term referring to the same individual in all possible worlds in which the latter exists. Following Kaplan’s suggestion, a sentence of the form “The *F* is *G*”, used referentially, can be represented as:

- DTHAT [the *F*] is *G*.

A word of clarification may be appropriate. In his latest study, Kaplan recognizes that when he first introduced ‘dthat’, he confused two distinct uses, namely ‘dthat’ as an *operator* with ‘dthat’ as a *demonstrative surrogate*. In the former case, ‘dthat’ is better understood as a rigidifier and, as such, the dthat-term becomes a rigid designator without being a directly referential term.³ In the latter case, however, the dthat-term is a singular, directly referential, term. In order to capture the referential use of a definite description, ‘dthat’ should be understood as a demonstrative surrogate.⁴ To summarize, the referential use of a definite description goes proxy with the use of a complex demonstrative, i.e. an expression of the form ‘that/this *F*’.

3. DESCRIPTION-NAMES

As I have already noted, written English has a convention that allows us to make a name out of a description: it suffices to use capital letters. The description ‘the rolling stones’ became the name of the famous rock group, The Rolling Stones, ‘the gunners’ became a name for the Arsenal football team, The Gunners, etc. Once a description reaches this status, it simply works like a name;⁵ it is a Millian expression referring to an object irrespectively of the properties that the latter has or does not have (the Rolling Stones are not stones, Arsenal players are not gunners – the question is still open whether The Holy Virgin was a virgin).⁶

There is nonetheless a feeling of uneasiness in the claim that a description-name works merely as a tag; this is due to the fact the name encapsulates a description. However, an utterance such as:

- (2) a The Holy Virgin is not a virgin

is not contradictory, for it should be treated on a par with:

- (2) b Mary is not a virgin

There is, however, certain information conveyed by (2a) which is not conveyed in (2b). It is mainly for these reasons that Dummett (1973) dismisses Kripke's criticism of the Fregean conception, arguing that 'St. Anne', for instance, could not refer to St. Anne if she was not the mother of Mary. This does *not* mean that 'St. Anne' could not be used to refer to the relevant woman before she gave birth to Mary, nor that she became St. Anne upon giving birth; yet, for 'St. Anne' to refer to St. Anne, the latter must have mothered Jesus' mother, i.e. Mary.

I do not believe that Dummett's remarks jeopardize Millianism about proper names. 'St. Anne' could be used to name St. Anne even if Mary turned out to have been adopted, or if St. Anne had killed Mary's mother in order to steal her baby. The same can be said of 'The Holy Virgin': it would still refer to Mary if we discovered that she enjoyed a sexual life with Joseph, or even that she had many occasional partners. 'The Holy Virgin' refers to Mary because she is *alleged* to have given birth to Jesus whilst a virgin; whether the story is true or not does not matter for the reference to succeed. There *is* a connotative feature of description-names, which one would like to capture in one's theory⁷ without giving up Millianism. In the remaining part of this paper, I attempt to do just that.

I now propose an argument in favour of the thesis that a description name both names and describes at the same time. That is, I shall show that description-names are directly referential terms, contributing the referent to the truth conditions and yet may also convey connotative information of the referent.

Utterances such as:

- (3) a The Holy Virgin mothered Jesus
- b The Evening Star is Jane's favourite star

can be analysed as:

- (3) c The Holy Virgin, who was a virgin, mothered Jesus
- d The Evening Star, which is a star appearing in the evening, is Jane's favourite star

An utterance such as (3c) expresses two distinct propositions: the proposition *that The Holy Virgin/Mary mothered Jesus* and the proposition *that The Holy Virgin/Mary was a virgin*. The theory of description-names I propose mimics a theory of subordinate clauses. In other words, the semantics of a sentence containing a description-name mirrors the semantics of a sentence containing a subordinate clause, which can either be a non-restrictive relative clause, an appositive, a parenthetical, etc. To illustrate this point, consider:

- (4) a Louis XIV (the king of France) is bald

b Louis XIV, who is king of France, is bald

The position I propose is a multiple-propositions view: the utterance of a single sentence can express several propositions,⁸ and the truth conditions on such utterances are independent of their subordinate clauses. In defending this contention, we must accept the following two theses:

- Utterances like (4a) and (4b) do not express a single, conjoint proposition, but instead express two or more distinct propositions. Utterances of (4a) and (4b) express the proposition *that Louis XIV is king of France* and the (distinct) proposition *that Louis XIV is bald*.
- The truth-values of utterances like (4a) and (4b) depend only on one of these propositions, namely the proposition expressed by the main clause.

I characterize the two propositions expressed *the background proposition* and *the official proposition*, the former being the proposition expressed by the subordinate clause. This distinction should capture the truism that a speaker usually aims to communicate the information expressed by the official proposition. The subordinate clause is often used merely as a tool or support, enabling the speaker to convey information. If one says, for instance, “Aristotle, Jacky Kennedy’s husband, is Greek”, one adds the description ‘Jacky Kennedy’s husband’ to emphasize that one is using the name of the magnate and not the homonym name of the Greek philosopher.⁹

On the analysis I propose, (3a) is true iff the official proposition is true, i.e., if The Holy Virgin mothered Jesus, regardless of her alleged virginity. The same applies to (3b): whether The Evening Star is a star or not, (3b) it is true/false regardless, i.e., independently of the truth-value of the background proposition.

As a further argument in favour of the theory of description-names I propose, I invite you to consider utterances such as:

- (5) a The Evening *Star*₁ is Jane’s favourite *one*₁
 b Pisa’s *Tower*₁ is *one*₁ of the most famous in Italy
 c Robin *Hood*₁ was so-called because he always wore *his*₁
 d Isn’t strange that [*The Evening Star*₁]₂ should be so-called since *it*₂ is not *one*₁?
 e Little [*Red*₁ Riding *Hood*₂]₃ was so-called because *she*₃ wore *one*₂ of *that color*₁

Following the widely accepted convention, each italicised pronoun in (5) is considered to be an anaphoric pronoun, linked to another italicised term, where the subscripts or indices indicate co-referentiality.¹⁰ Without entering into the details of a theory of anaphora and discussing syntactic constraints,¹¹ for the sake of my argument it suffices to assume that an

anaphoric pronoun *inherits* its reference from its antecedent; the antecedent fixes the semantic value of the pronoun. Note that the anaphoric pronoun does not always go proxy for its antecedent; it is not merely a pronoun of laziness.¹² Anaphoric links may transcend a single utterance, or even transcend utterances spoken by a single speaker, in which case we have an example of *discourse anaphora*.¹³ I assume that an *anaphoric chain* is at work when the value of a pronoun is inherited from the value of the head of the chain.¹⁴

If description-names were semantically inert, i.e. mere Millian tags, then we would face difficulties accounting for sentences like (5), for how could the anaphoric pronouns inherit their reference from an antecedent if the latter plays no semantic role whatsoever? How could ‘one’ in (5a) inherit its reference from ‘Star’ if the latter does not play a semantic role in the name it appears in? The picture of description-names I propose helps us handle this phenomenon with ease, for it allows that ‘Star’ plays a semantic role insofar as it contributes to the expression of a background proposition.¹⁵

The same phenomenon, i.e. an anaphoric pronoun bound by an element appearing within the noun-phrase, occurs in cases involving complex demonstratives, i.e. expressions of the form ‘this/that *F*’. So, as far as anaphora are concerned, complex demonstratives and description-names present a similar problem. Consider:

- (6) a That woman talking to *Joe*₁ is charming *him*₁
 b [*That man drinking [white₁ burgundy]*₂]₃ is savouring *it*₂. *He*₃
 always drinks wine of *that color*₁

Since utterances (6) and (5) are similar (similar anaphoric chains are at work in both), they suggest that complex demonstratives and description-names should be treated, as far as anaphora are concerned, on a par. The picture I propose allows us to do just that, and for this reason I now turn to compare description-names and complex demonstratives in using the functors ‘Dname’ and ‘Dthat’.

4. DNAME AND DTHAT

The theory I propose concerning description-names extends to complex demonstratives. If we adopt DTHAT *qua* demonstrative surrogate, as introduced by Kaplan, we can represent a sentence containing a complex demonstrative, i.e. a sentence of the form “That *F* is *G*” as:

- DTHAT [the *F*] is *G*

It should not come as a surprise that the representation we end up with is the same as the one proposed for the referential use of definite descriptions.

It is worth noticing, however, that there is a difference between complex demonstratives and description-names; whilst the former refer in virtue of the demonstrative, proper names do not. This reflects the fact that proper names and demonstratives are different tools of reference, the latter referring in virtue of a demonstration or directing intention (Kaplan, 1989) to an object made salient in a given context of utterance, the former referring because of a pre-established convention. Proper names *qua* tags stand for their referent in virtue of a convention linking the name to its referent. Description-names, *qua* (proper) names, also refer in virtue of an established convention but, on top of directly referring to their referent, they also convey certain information, i.e. whatever is communicated by the background proposition. To stress the difference between description-names and complex demonstratives, I propose a modification of Kaplan's DTHAT device in introducing a new one, DNAME, the former being a demonstrative surrogate, the latter a surrogate for proper names. As such, DNAME can be used in our formal system to make a description a description-name: roughly, to make a proper name out of a description. DNAME should capture the written English convention of using capital letters when a proper name is in play. Putting it slightly differently, when a description is used referentially, DTHAT *qua* demonstrative surrogate stresses that the description within its scope works like a singular term; in particular, like a complex demonstrative. DNAME *qua* proper name surrogate also stresses that the description within its scope works like a singular term; in particular, like a proper name and, more precisely, like a description-name.

There is a further difference worth mentioning: when one uses a complex demonstrative, one *intends* the descriptive material to apply to the referent, even though the success of the reference does not depend of the success of this intention. With most description-names, however, there is no such intention. In a nutshell, when a description is prefixed by DTHAT, the latter is transformed into a complex demonstrative and when a description is prefixed by DNAME, the latter is transformed into a description-name. Hence when a description is used as a proper name, a sentence like "The *F* is *G*" can be represented as:

- DNAME [The *F*] is *G*

where 'Dname' can be viewed as a functor, which forms directly referential terms (Millian terms) denoting individuals.

Adopting the suggestions I propose, we are in a position to stress, in a formal language, the various uses of a definite descriptions: (i) the attributive use, i.e. the use as a quantified term, (ii) the referential use – Dthat is

our tool – and (iii) the use as a proper name, where *Dname* is our tool. We can thus accommodate Barcan Marcus' suggestion that, in formal analysis, we should separate the proper-name-like use of a description from its predicative use. As an illustration of how the distinction can be used in formal analysis, I invite you to consider an inference of the form:

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{The } F \text{ is } G \\ \text{The } F \text{ is } H \\ \hline \text{So: the } F \text{ is } G \ \& \ H \end{array}$$

This inference can have as many interpretations as the various interpretations we can give of each description. Let us consider the following possible instantiation of this inference:

$$\begin{array}{l} (7) \quad \text{The murderer of Smith is insane} \\ \quad \text{The murderer of Smith is a woman} \\ \hline \text{So: The murderer of Smith is insane and a woman} \end{array}$$

This inference is valid insofar as it is represented – where '*F*' stands for 'the murderer of Smith', '*G*' for 'insane' and '*H*' for 'woman' – as:

$$\begin{array}{l} (7) \text{ a} \quad (\exists x)(Fx \ \& \ (y)(Fy \rightarrow x = y) \ \& \ Gx) \\ \quad \quad (\exists x)(Fx \ \& \ (y)(Fy \rightarrow x = y) \ \& \ Hx) \\ \hline \text{So: } (\exists x)(Fx \ \& \ (y)(Fy \rightarrow x = y) \ \& \ Gx \ \& \ Hx) \end{array}$$

On the other hand, an inference such as:

$$\begin{array}{l} (8) \quad \text{DTHAT (The murderer of Smith) is insane} \\ \quad \text{The murderer of Smith is a woman} \\ \hline \text{So: The murderer of Smith is insane and a woman} \end{array}$$

is invalid, for we formalise (8) as:

$$\begin{array}{l} (8) \text{ a} \quad Ga \\ \quad \quad (\exists x)(Fx \ \& \ (y)(Fy \rightarrow x = y) \ \& \ Hx) \\ \hline \text{So: } (\exists x)(Fx \ \& \ (y)(Fy \rightarrow x = y) \ \& \ Gx \ \& \ Hx) \end{array}$$

For inference (8) to become valid, the description in the conclusion needs to be understood as used referentially, i.e.:

- (9) DTHAT (The murderer of Smith) is insane [Ga]
 The murderer of Smith is a woman
 $[(\exists x)(Fx \ \& \ (y)(Fy \rightarrow x = y) \ \& \ Hx)]$
-
- So: DTHAT (The murderer of Smith) is insane and
 a woman [$Ga \ \& \ Ha$]

If all the descriptions receive the referential interpretation, our inference is also valid:

- (10) DTHAT (The murderer of Smith) is insane [Ga]
 DTHAT (The murderer of Smith) is a woman [Ha]
-
- So: DTHAT (The murderer of Smith) is insane and
 a woman [$Ga \ \& \ Ha$]

The very same exercise, which I leave for the reader, can be done in replacing DTHAT with DNAME. In our formal system, DTHAT and DNAME are functors working exactly in the same way, insofar as they form a singular term out of a description.

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NOTES

¹ In 1846, LeVerrier's calculations indicated the presence of an unknown planet in an orbit outside that of Uranus, leading to the discovery of Neptune. In 1855, LeVerrier also noticed irregularities in the movement of Mercury and predicted the existence of another unknown planet, beyond Uranus, causing the disruption; he named it 'Vulcan'.

² For argument's sake, let us forget for the time being that Venus is not a star.

³ Complete dthat-terms would be rigid, in fact *obstinately* rigid. In this case the proposition would not carry the individual itself into a possible world but rather would carry

instructions to run back home and get the individual who there satisfies certain specifications. The complete dthat-term would then be a rigid description which induces a complex 'representation' of the referent into the content. (Kaplan, 1989, p. 580)

⁴ The operator interpretation is not what I originally intended. The word 'dthat' was intended to be a surrogate for a true demonstrative, and the description which completes it was intended to be a surrogate for the completing demonstration. On this interpretation 'dthat' is a syntactically complete singular term that requires no *syntactical* completion by an operand. (A 'pointing', being extralinguistic, could hardly be a part of syntax.) The description completes the *character* of the associated occurrence of 'dthat', but makes no contribution to content. . . . 'Dthat' is no more an operator than is 'I', though neither has a referent unless semantically 'completed' by a context in the one case and a demonstration in the other. (Kaplan, 1989, p. 581)

⁵ Just as with proper names, we may find homonym description-names. There are several groups called 'The Rolling Stones'; most adopted or borrowed the name of the famous group, just as many places have adopted or borrowed names such as 'Paris', 'Rome', etc.

⁶ As Barcan Marcus aptly stresses: "Much has been made recently of the fact that a description, even an erroneous one, may serve on occasion to refer (purely) to an object. That may be pragmatically interesting, but such uses are more akin to the use of demonstratives. 'The women over there drinking martini' may serve on a particular occasion to tag a particular man drinking champagne, but if its use is idiosyncratic and transient, it is like a discardable tag, for it does not enter into the common language. Occasionally such ways of referring become entrenched, and a measure of such entrenchment is the conversion of a description fully to a proper name. Ordinary English has a way of marking the change by using capitals. 'The Evening Star' serves as an example. It is curious that so simple a typographical device for separating the proper-name-like use of a description from its predicative use has never been employed in formal analysis. How directly the apparent contradiction in 'The evening star is not a star' is dispelled by 'The Evening Star is not a star'." (Barcan Marcus, 1975, pp. 106–7)

⁷ To be sure, the connotative aspect of description-names like 'The Sharks', 'The Rolling Stones', etc. is not so striking.

⁸ The idea that a single utterance may express (or convey) more than a single proposition is far from new: it plays a central role in the works of Grice (1989) and Perry (1988), for instance. Perry distinguishes between the proposition expressed and the proposition created, whereas Grice distinguishes between a proposition expressed and a proposition implicated. In more recent works, Perry (see especially 2001) distinguishes between the incremental (in the sense of additional) truth conditions and the reflexive truth conditions, the former being what is said and the latter concerning the utterance itself and the conditions it must satisfy in order to be true. Bach (1999) proposes a multiple-propositions view, too, in order to deal with alleged conventional implicature devices such as 'even', 'too', 'despite', 'but', 'therefore', etc. and non-restrictive relative clauses. He assumes that all propositions must be taken on a par and, therefore, is committed to the thesis that sentences do not have a unified truth-value. As will become clear, I do not share this view. For a defence of a multiple-propositions view, see also Neale (1999). Dever (2001) applies the multiple-propositions picture to complex demonstratives.

⁹ When the relative clause is satisfied but the name is not, as is the case with "Socrates, Jackie Kennedy's husband, is a ship owner", the utterance is infelicitous and what is said false, for Socrates does not own a ship.

¹⁰ For a well-developed theory of indices characterising syntactic and semantic identities, see Fiengo and May (1994).

¹¹ These are particularly evident in the case of so-called *bound-variable anaphora*, where a pronoun is bound by a quantifier. In such cases, the reference of the pronoun varies systematically with the choice of individual determined by the quantifier, e.g.: *Every man* loves *his* wife. For a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon see, for instance, Larson and Segal (1995, 361ff). It is less evident in the case of unbound anaphora and discourse anaphora.

¹² The terminology ‘pronoun of laziness’ comes from Geach (1962). He does, however, recognise that “not all relative pronouns can . . . be treated as pronouns of laziness. . . . In (21) [Smith broke the bank at Monte Carlo, and he has recently died a pauper] the pronoun ‘he’ is apparently one of laziness, but ‘he’ in (20) [Just one man broke the bank at Monte Carlo, and he has recently died a pauper] is not replaceable by ‘just one man’ or ‘a man’ without essentially altering the force of the proposition.” (Geach, 1962, p. 125)

¹³ In short, I subsume under the label ‘anaphora’ both bound-variable anaphora, bound anaphora, unbound anaphora and discourse anaphora.

¹⁴ The notion of a chain to characterise anaphoric links is borrowed from Evans (1977).

¹⁵ It may be worth noticing that, if the argument from anaphora does prove that description-names are not merely semantically inert Millian tags, it does not rule out the Russellian theory that proper names and, *a fortiori* description-names, are disguised definite descriptions.

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