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On epithets *qua* attributive anaphors¹

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A multiple-proposition theory is proposed, according to which a single utterance can express several distinct propositions. An utterance of “Jon, the idiot, missed the train” expresses the official proposition THAT JON MISSED THE TRAIN and the background proposition THAT JON IS AN IDIOT. It is argued that only the official proposition affects the truth-value of the utterance, while the background proposition(s) may be treated similarly to pragmatic presuppositions. The multiple-proposition theory helps us to defend the thesis that, in an utterance such as “Jon₁ promised to come but *the idiot*₁ missed the train”, the epithet *the idiot* must be understood as an attributive anaphor, for it inherits its value from *Jon* and attributes to Jon the property of being an idiot. It is argued that epithets in such constructions should be viewed in a way similar to quasi-indicators, insofar as the latter are also attributive anaphors. The quasi-indicator *she herself* in “Jane₁ believes that *she (herself)*₁ is rich” inherits its value from *Jane* and attributes an *I*-thought to Jane. In focusing on the similarities and differences between epithets and quasi-indicators, we can explain some alleged difficulties, difficulties which suggest that epithets cannot be anaphoric (e.g. “*Jon₁ claimed/said/thinks/ ... that *the bastard*₁ was honest”). It is shown that the ungrammaticality of sentences like these rests on the fact that the epithet is embedded in what should be a *de se* attribution (e.g. “Jon₁ claimed/said/thinks that *he (himself)*₁ was honest”) while its nature is to contribute to the expression of a *de re* attribution. This helps us to understand the ungrammaticality of “*Jane₁ said/thinks/promised/ ... that *the idiot*₁ will come” vs. the grammaticality of “Jane₁ said/ thinks/ promised/ ... that *she (herself)*₁ will come” on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the ungrammaticality of “*Jon₁ ran over a man who was trying to give *he (himself)*₁ directions” vs. the grammaticality of “Jon₁ ran over a man who was trying to give *the idiot*₁ directions”.

[1] An ancestor of this paper was first presented at the Linguistics Seminar Series at University College, London, on 30 April, 2003. Comments by the audience were very useful. Subsequently, parts of the paper were presented at the University of Leeds, the University of Geneva and the Institute Jean-Nicod in Paris. Many thanks to the audiences for their valuable comments. For comments and discussion I would also like to thank S. Barker, R. Carston, C. Chiesa, A. Cormack, F. Correia, G. Currie, J. Dokic, B. Frances, R. Glauser, E. Jaworska, P. Keller, L. Nash, J. Pelletier, J. Perry, M. Popa, S. Predelli, F. Recanati, P. Simon, G. F. Soldati, M. Whitsey and D. Wilson. Last, but not least, I have also benefited from comments by a *JL* referee. The remaining mistakes are all my own responsibility.

I. INTRODUCTION

My *New shorter Oxford English dictionary* registers that an epithet – from the ancient Greek *epithetos* ‘is a word or phrase expressing an attribute or quality regarded as characteristic of the person or thing mentioned; a significant appellation; a suitable descriptive term’ (p. 839). It also mentions that an epithet is ‘an offensive or derogatory expression used of a person; a term of abuse, a profanity’ (ibid.). Epithets are usually used to characterize the nature of a subject and they may be stereotypical.² From a grammatical point of view, epithets are phrases which typically consist of a noun phrase coupled with the definite article (in which case they are like definite descriptions, e.g. *the idiot*, *the mbastard*) or a demonstrative (in which case they are like complex demonstratives, e.g. *this/that idiot*, *this/that bastard*). The latter type contributes mainly affective (often negative) meaning.

In what follows, I defend three main ideas:

I. In adopting a multiple-proposition framework, i.e. the view that a single utterance may express more than one proposition, I argue that an epithet works like a parenthetical and contributes to the expression of a background proposition. Thus, (1) and (2) should be treated on a par.

- (1) Jon said that he would come but **the idiot** missed the train.
 (2) Jon (Jane’s husband) is rich.

(1) expresses the official proposition THAT JON SAID THAT HE WILL COME AND THAT HE MISSED THE TRAIN and the background proposition THAT JON IS AN IDIOT, and (2) expresses the official proposition THAT JON IS RICH and the background proposition THAT JON IS JANE’S HUSBAND. I shall argue that the background proposition does not affect the truth-value of the utterance expressing it. In favor of this idea I shall show how epithets, like parentheticals, can be cancelled. To (1) and (2), one could reply with (1a) and (2a), respectively, and in so doing cancel the parenthetical/epithet:

- (1) (a) Sure, he missed the train, but he is not an idiot; he has just won the Nobel Prize!
 (2) (a) Yes, he is rich but he is not married to Jane; he divorced her last year.

II. The information conveyed by an epithet behaves like a speaker-oriented presupposition. That is to say, the information that Jon is an idiot, expressed by (1), is best viewed as a presupposition.

[2] In the Greek epic literature epithets used to be words or phrases accompanying or taking the place of proper names. Thus in the *Odyssey*, for instance, Athena the goddess is first introduced as *grey-eyed Athena* (book 1) and subsequently often referred to as merely *the grey-eyed*. Nowadays many epithets are racially or sexually abusive (e.g. *the nigger*, *the fag*, *the queer*, etc.). For this very reason, the *Columbia guide to Standard American English* (1993), under the label ‘offensive epithets and dispraising labels’, states that ‘the best advice is to call people only what they *want* to be called. Apply sharp-pointed epithets only to yourself’ (www.bartleby.com/68/).

(3) Jon's wife is blonde.

(3) also conveys two propositions, THAT JOHN HAS A WIFE and THAT SHE IS BLONDE. While the former is presupposed, the latter is asserted. The negation of (3), in (3a), also conveys the presupposition THAT JON HAS A WIFE.

(3) (a) It is not the case that John's wife is blonde.

The same happens with the negation of (1), in (1b), which conveys the proposition THAT JON IS AN IDIOT.

(1) (b) It is not the case that Jon₁ said that he would come and the idiot₁ missed the train.

III. When epithets are anaphoric (or bound) they are complementary to quasi-indicators. Epithets display the following interesting features: they can act either (i) as anaphoric pronouns or (ii) as bound variables. Consider:

(4) Jane₁ said that she would come but **the idiot**₁ will probably miss the train.

(5) Every student₁ promised to come but **the idiots**₁ missed the train.

In (4) the epithet *the idiot* is anaphoric on *Jane*, while in (5) it is bound by *every student*. Quasi-indicators like *she herself*, *he himself*, *they themselves*, etc. in utterances like (6) and (7) can also be anaphoric and work as bound variables.³

(6) Jane₁ believes that **she herself**₁ is rich.

(7) Every winner₁ believes that **she herself**₁ is rich.

In constructions such as (4)–(7), both the epithets and the quasi-indicators are attributive, in addition to being anaphoric. In (4) and (6) they attribute a particular property to the referent of the NP (*Jane*) from which they inherit their value. While the epithet *the idiot* in (4) attributes the property of being an idiot to *Jane*, the quasi-indicator *she herself* in (6) attributes to her an *I*-thought, i.e. a thought one would express using the first person pronoun. The multiple-proposition framework I develop in this paper helps us to handle the anaphoric characteristic of epithets without giving up their attributive nature. I claim that both epithets acting as anaphoric pronouns or bound variables and quasi-indicators are paradigmatic cases of what I label ATTRIBUTIVE ANAPHORA. I shall show how epithets are best understood if analyzed alongside quasi-indicators. For, while a quasi-indicator like *she*

[3] Quasi-indicators were introduced into the philosophical literature by Castañeda (1966, 1967, 1968). Chierchia (1989) shows how in many cases the unpronounced subjects of infinitive clauses, PRO, can only be used to report an *I* or *de se* thought. Actually, an attribution like “Pavarotti very much wants to get help” entails “Pavarotti very much wants for Pavarotti to get help” but not conversely. That is, a *de se* attribution entails a *de re* one, but a *de re* ascription does not necessarily entail a *de se* one. ‘This explains why PRO, the subject of infinitives, will in general be interpreted *de se*, and unambiguously so’ (Chierchia 1989: 16). For more on this issue see Corazza (2004a: chapter 8; 2004b).

herself attributes an egocentric (*de se*) thought to the referent of the NP that it inherits its value from, epithets are transparent (*de re*). This difference helps us explain why (8) and (9) are ungrammatical.

- (8) *Jon₁ claimed that the bastard₁ was honest.
 (9) *Jon₁ thinks that I admire the idiot₁.

It also helps us explain why (10) and (11) are grammatical.

- (10) Jon₁ claimed that he₁ was honest.
 (11) Jon₁ thinks that I admire him₁.

By exploiting the traditional *de re* vs. *de se* distinction, we can show that the ungrammaticality of (8) and (9) is triggered by the fact that the epithet is embedded in what should be a *de se* report, while its nature is to contribute to the expression of a *de re* ascription. If my explanation is satisfactory, we can handle these examples without giving up the idea that epithets can work as anaphoric pronouns, *pace* Lasnik (1976).

2. THE MULTIPLE-PROPOSITION FRAMEWORK

An epithet often manifests itself under the guise of a (definite) description that modifies a singular term to form a compound noun phrase. Famous examples include *Best the Best*, *Alexander the Great*, *Jack the Ripper*, etc.⁴ Sometimes, an epithet can be coupled with an indexical expression, e.g. *he, the bastard*; *you, the sweetheart*; *we, the red devils*; etc. Let us consider (12)–(15).

- (12) Jon, **the fool**, missed the train.
 (13) You, **the sweetheart**, insulted the dean.
 (14) The director of the corporation, **the fat cat**, got into trouble with his bank.
 (15) Bush, **the illiterate warmonger**, invaded Iraq.

As a first approximation, we could say that utterances such as these are synonymous with (12a)–(15a).

- (12) (a) Jon is a fool **and** Jon missed the train.
 (13) (a) You are the sweetheart **and** you insulted the dean.
 (14) (a) The director of the corporation is a fat cat **and** the director of the corporation got into trouble with his bank.
 (15) (a) Bush is an illiterate warmonger **and** Bush invaded Iraq.

If this is right, then utterances like (12)–(15) express at least two propositions, or a conjoined proposition (p & q). For reasons that will become clear later

[4] In some cases, the epithet became capitalized and formed a complex name, such as *Alexander the Great*, *The Holy Virgin*, *Sitting Bull*, etc. For a discussion of these compound proper names see Corazza (2002a).

in this section – when I argue that these propositions cannot be treated on a par when it comes to compute the truth-condition of the utterance expressing them – I assume that they express two distinct propositions, set out in (12b)–(15b).

- (12) (b) Prop. 1: THAT JON IS A FOOL
 Prop. 2: THAT JON MISSED THE TRAIN
- (13) (b) Prop. 1: THAT YOU ARE A GOOD STUDENT
 Prop. 2: THAT YOU INSULTED THE DEAN
- (14) (b) Prop. 1: THAT THE DIRECTOR OF THE CORPORATION IS A FAT CAT
 Prop. 2: THAT THE DIRECTOR OF THE CORPORATION GOT INTO TROUBLE
 WITH HIS BANK
- (15) (b) Prop. 1: THAT BUSH IS AN ILLITERATE WARMONGER
 Prop. 2: THAT BUSH INVADED IRAQ

The idea that a single utterance may convey more than a single proposition has been around for some time. It plays, for instance, a central role in the works of Perry (1988) and Grice (1989). Grice distinguishes between a proposition expressed and a proposition implicated, while Perry distinguishes between the proposition expressed and the proposition created:

The proposition expressed by my utterance [You are spilling coffee] is that Ellsworth is spilling coffee. The proposition created by it is that its speaker is addressing someone who is spilling coffee. Both can be regarded as singular propositions, one about Ellsworth, one about my utterance. (Perry 1988: 197)

In more recent work, Perry (2001 especially) distinguishes between the incremental (in the sense of additional) truth-conditions and the reflexive or pure truth-conditions. The former is WHAT IS SAID, while the latter concerns the utterance itself and expresses the conditions it must satisfy in order to be true. For the time being we do not have to distinguish between a position claiming that a single utterance expresses two or more propositions and a position, like Grice's for instance, holding that an utterance expresses a given proposition and conveys/implicates/creates/entails/imparts/presupposes/etc. other propositions.⁵

The question that springs to mind is the following: what are the truth-conditions of (12)–(15)? In particular, is an utterance such as (12) true only if the proposition THAT JON IS A FOOL and the proposition THAT JON MISSED THE TRAIN are both true? Should BOTH the proposition THAT JON IS A FOOL and the

[5] Bach (1999) proposes a multiple-proposition view, too, in order to deal with alleged conventional implicature devices such as *even*, *too*, *despite*, *but*, *therefore*, etc. and non-restrictive relative clauses. For a defense of a multiple-proposition view, see also Neale (1999) and Dever (2001). Dever analyzes complex demonstratives, i.e. expressions of the form *that F* using the multiple-proposition view. An utterance like “That F [pointing to Bill] is G” will express the proposition THAT BILL IS F and the proposition THAT BILL IS G.

proposition THAT JON MISSED THE TRAIN be treated equally? Or could an utterance of (12) be true even if the proposition THAT JON IS A FOOL is false?

I now try to show why both propositions should not be treated equally. Hence, I shall argue against the view that an utterance like (12) is true if and only if both propositions expressed are true. The position I propose should help to deal with the intuition that, given an utterance like (12), the speaker's main aim is to communicate the proposition THAT JON MISSED THE TRAIN and that s/he says something true if and only if Jon missed the train, regardless on whether or not Jon is also a fool.⁶ Let us call this the COMMUNICATION INTUITION; if we aim to accommodate it, then the natural way to treat epithets is to view them on the parenthetical model. The information carried by the epithet is best understood along the lines of our understanding of the information carried by the terms appearing within parentheses in utterances like (16)–(19).

- (16) Jane (my best student) graduated with a distinction.
- (17) Aristotle (the Greek philosopher) wrote several influential books.
- (18) Socrates (the famous Brazilian footballer) played for Fiorentina while Rai (Socrates' brother) made the fortune of Paris St.-Germain.
- (19) Campbell (the Arsenal player) is almost as famous as Campbell (the model).


In uttering sentences such as these, it is likely that the speaker appeals to the information carried by the linguistic material appearing within the parentheses in order to help the audience to identify the referents. The speaker adds the parenthetical remark with the aim of disambiguating a name (or, according to another view, of indicating the right name among many homophonic ones), thus helping the audience to identify the object(s) of discourse, etc. The parenthetical information works in the same way that *the financial institution* in “Mary has been to the bank (the financial institution)” works. The utterances in (16)–(19) also express two propositions. (16) expresses the proposition THAT JANE IS THE SPEAKER'S BEST STUDENT and the proposition THAT JANE GRADUATED WITH A DISTINCTION, (17) expresses the proposition THAT ARISTOTLE IS THE GREEK PHILOSOPHER and the proposition THAT ARISTOTLE WROTE SEVERAL INFLUENTIAL BOOKS, and so on. Following our communication intuition, however, these propositions should not be treated on a par.⁷

[6] I do not claim, though, that one who would take both propositions on a par and argue that both propositions must be true for the utterance to be true, could not handle this intuition. A friend of this view could well argue that the communicative intuition can be accounted for by invoking a distinction between what is said (semantics) and what is communicated (pragmatics) or a distinction between speaker reference vs. semantic reference distinction. My point is merely that if one does not consider both propositions on a par, one is not forced to appeal to these distinctions to deal with epithets within the multiple-proposition framework.

[7] Note that if we treat the descriptions in parenthesis as attributive (and as ranging over the whole universe), the propositions THAT ARISTOTLE IS THE GREEK PHILOSOPHER, THAT

In order to account for the communicative intuition, I propose to characterize the two propositions expressed as the BACKGROUND PROPOSITION and the OFFICIAL PROPOSITION, respectively. The former is the proposition conveyed by the parenthetical expression. By the same token, I propose to regard as background proposition the proposition expressed by an epithet. The important point is that the truth-value of an utterance containing either an epithet or a parenthetical is inherited only from the truth-value of the official proposition. The truth-value of the background proposition does NOT affect the truth-value of the utterance expressing it. Thus, an utterance of (12), for instance, expresses the background proposition THAT JON IS A FOOL and the official proposition THAT JON MISSED THE TRAIN, and it is true if and only if Jon missed the train, i.e. if and only if the official proposition is true.

The position I have in mind can be stated using the Gricean, or Grice-inspired, distinction between the proposition expressed and the proposition implicated. With the Griceans I maintain that not all propositions conveyed affect the truth-value of the utterance conveying them. Unlike the Griceans, however, I do not claim that the background proposition is merely implicated. I maintain that the background proposition is expressed by the utterance; it is part of what is said. Actually, in an utterance with a parenthetical, for instance, it would be difficult to argue that the parenthetical material merely participates in implicating a proposition, i.e. that it does not contribute to what is expressed by the utterance. The following diagram summarizes the distinctions I assume:



There appear to be two related objections to the view I propose. First, one can claim that my picture departs from the tradition insofar as it gives up the idea that only an utterance as a whole can be judged to be true or false. If I am right in claiming that an utterance may express several propositions, then an utterance does not have a unitary truth-condition. It has as many truth-conditions as propositions it expresses. For this objection to work, one must treat the background proposition and the official proposition as having

CAMPBELL IS THE ARSENAL PLAYER, etc. are false, insofar as there are several Greek philosophers and several Arsenal players. To avoid this consequence, one could understand the descriptions to be short for *the philosopher identical to Aristotle, the Arsenal player identical to Campbell*, etc. Alternatively, one could argue that these descriptions range over a restricted domain. This is a topic that goes far beyond the scope of this paper and can be ignored here.

equal status. I argue, however, that the official proposition plays a primary role while the background proposition plays a subordinate role. What matters for the truth-condition of the whole utterance is the truth-condition of the official proposition. For this reason, an utterance containing a parenthetical or an epithet can be either true or false independently of the truth-conditions of the background proposition. The utterance inherits the truth-value of the official proposition. An utterance as a whole can thus be judged to be true or false.⁸ In support of the thesis that the background proposition does not affect the truth-value of the whole utterance, we can quote utterances such as (20) and (21).

(20) Jane, as you know, married Ivan.

(21) Ivan, as we predicted, was caught by the FBI.

(20) asserts only that Jane married Ivan, while (21) asserts only that Ivan was caught by the FBI. In addition, (20) conveys the proposition that the addressee knows that Jane married Ivan, and (21) conveys the proposition that we thought it was predictable that Ivan would be caught by the FBI. The truth-values of (20) and (21) depend only on the propositions asserted, i.e. the official propositions; the background propositions do not affect their truth-values. To stress this fact further, consider the conversation between A and B in (22).

(22) A: Jane (as you know) married Ivan.

B: Actually I didn't know that. It comes as a surprise to me.

The parenthetical clause can be cancelled without affecting the truth-value of the utterance. A parallel situation occurs with epithets, as is shown in (23).

(23) A: Sue told Jon₁ that the idiot₁ should run for president.

B: Actually he is not an idiot. He has a Ph.D. in Political Sciences.

Like the proposition expressed by the parenthetical *as you know*, the proposition expressed by epithet *the idiot* can be cancelled without affecting the truth-value of the utterance.

At this point, it may be helpful to show how the position I am defending relates to a theory of presupposition.⁹ One can claim that the background proposition plays the same role as a presupposition. As a first approximation, we can say that when one uses a proper name, for instance, one usually uses

[8] Indeed, the parenthetical may be rather complex and contain detailed information, e.g. "Jon (the red-haired boss of the band who robbed the bank on Main St. two weeks ago) got caught". In such cases, the communicative intuition is less evident and does not seem to support the idea that the proposition expressed by the parenthetical, i.e. the background proposition, does not affect the truth-value of the whole utterance. Even if the linguistic interchange focuses on the information carried by the parenthetical in these cases, I maintain that the background proposition does not affect the truth-value of the whole utterance.

[9] For a good discussion of different theories of presupposition, see Soames 1989.

it under the presupposition that the referent exists. When one uses a definite description like *the Queen of England*, however, one uses it with the presupposition that there is at least one, and not more than one, Queen in England. When one uses an epithet, one does so with the presupposition that the referent satisfies the properties that the epithet attributes to this referent. To clarify this point, we can focus on Donnellan's (1966) famous distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. With the referential use, the speaker presupposes that the referent satisfies the descriptive content of the description. If one says, "The man with the martini is rich" whilst focusing one's attention on a particular man, one refers to that man (Ivan, say) and presupposes that he is drinking martini. Yet, Donnellan tells us, one can succeed in referring to the relevant man even if he is drinking plain water. What one says is true if and only if Ivan is rich, regardless of the liquid in his glass. The descriptive content of the description is used in order to select an object of discourse. Using the notion of presupposition, we can claim that, with an utterance like this, the speaker EXPRESSES the proposition THAT IVAN IS RICH and PRESUPPOSES the proposition THAT IVAN IS DRINKING MARTINI. If I am right, the presupposed proposition does not affect the truth-value of the utterance; it merely rests on the asserted proposition. The notion of presupposition I am working with is, therefore, a pragmatic one. We can thus follow Stalnaker, who claims that

Presupposition, as ordinarily understood, is a propositional attitude, and not a semantic relation. It is speakers who make presuppositions; what they presuppose are the things they take for granted when they speak – things they take to go without saying. If this is what presupposition is, then the falsity of something one presupposes will not necessarily be incompatible with the truth or falsity of what one says when making those presuppositions. (Stalnaker 1999: 7)

Communication can succeed even if a presupposition turns out to be false. It is worth noting, however, that the speaker assumes the background proposition to be true. One would not use *the man with the martini* if one were aware that the relevant man is drinking plain water. Thus, from the speaker's (or agent's) point of view, we can say that the speaker commits herself to both what is asserted and what is presupposed. Consider (24), for example.

(24) Igor broke the vase.

With an utterance like this, the speaker ASSERTS that Igor broke the vase; this presupposes that the vase was broken. An interesting feature that distinguishes assertions from presuppositions is that presuppositions, unlike assertions, are heritable. That is, presuppositions are usually maintained by negatives, interrogatives and conditional antecedents:

- (25) (a) Jane regrets having married Ivan.
 (b) Jane does not regret having married Ivan.

- (c) Does Jane regret having married Ivan?
- (d) If Jane regrets having married Ivan, she should ask for a divorce.
- (e) **Jane married Ivan.**

(25a–d) entail (25e) and thus the proposition THAT JANE MARRIED IVAN. (25e) is taken for granted, it is presupposed.

The same is the case with epithets or parentheticals:

- (26) (a) Jane, the idiot, missed the train.
- (b) Jane, the idiot, did not miss the train.
- (c) Did Jane, the idiot, miss the train?
- (d) If Jane, the idiot, missed the train, she won't be home until tomorrow.
- (e) **Jane is an idiot.**
- (27) (a) Jane (Ivan's mistress) missed the train.
- (b) Jane (Ivan's mistress) did not miss the train.
- (c) Did Jane (Ivan's mistress) miss the train?
- (d) If Jane (Ivan's mistress) missed the train, she won't be home tonight.
- (e) **Jane is Ivan's mistress.**

(26e) and (27e) are entailed by each of (26a–d) and (27a–d), respectively. Unlike presuppositions, though, they are not tacitly entailed. They are stated by the utterance and thus expressed. However, like presuppositions, they are BACKGROUND propositions. This feature goes hand in hand with the idea that a presupposition can be backgrounded at any stage in a stretch of discourse. At any time during a given discourse situation, a proposition can either be presupposed or expressed via a parenthetical (or a non-restrictive relative clause). Such a proposition comes in as an aside, as additional and background information which helps to convey the main message. The main point I would like to make can be stated as follows. When one uses an epithet or a parenthetical, one is relying on a presupposition. One presupposes that the referent satisfies the description expressed by the epithet or the parenthetical. The proposition that the epithet or the parenthetical conveys plays a role similar to a presupposed proposition and, as such, does not affect the truth-value of the utterance.¹⁰ In a nutshell, if we analyze background propositions similarly to presuppositions, they are best understood as PRAGMATIC presuppositions.

The multiple-proposition picture I have in mind bears some resemblance to Dever's (2001) multiple-proposition concept proposed to deal with complex demonstratives, i.e. noun phrases of the form *that F* (cf. fn. 5).¹¹ He argues


[10] As Stalnaker argues, 'The pragmatic account makes it possible to explain some pragmatic facts about presuppositions in terms of general maxims of rational communication rather than in terms of complicated and *ad hoc* hypotheses about the semantics of particular words and particular kinds of constructions' (Stalnaker 1974: 48).

[11] For a discussion of complex demonstratives and how the multiple-proposition approach can deal with them, see Corazza (2002b).

that constructions with appositives, i.e. noun-headed constructions combined with other terms, are the correct models with which to understand complex demonstratives, and claims that a sentence with an appositive includes two sentences, expressing two propositions:


The next question, of course, is *why* sentences with appositives express two propositions. The suggestion is that it is because such ‘sentences’ are in fact *two* sentences. (Dever 2001: 295f.)

The syntactic trees representing the structure of a sentence containing a parenthetical or an appositive can be multi-rooted. That is to say, the sentences have a grammar that gives rise to trees in which one noun phrase is shared by two sentences:



One noun phrase (NP) (subject) combines with different verbs phrases (VPs) as a component of each sentence. To illustrate this, let us consider the representation of the utterance in (16) above, “Jane (my best student) graduated with a distinction”, given here in (16a).

(16) (a)




Here, S_1 and S_2 share the NP, *Jane*. (16a) helps to visualize that (16) contains two top-level root clauses (Ss). One dominates *Jane graduated with a distinction* while the other dominates *Jane is my best student*.¹² An utterance of

[12] For a more detailed discussion of the syntax of appositives and complex demonstratives (and some consequences of the multi-rooted syntax adopted), see Dever (2001).

the former expresses the official proposition while an utterance of the latter expresses the background proposition. To be precise, (16) is a single utterance, but a single utterance can be a token of two distinct sentences, i.e. an utterance can incorporate different sentences. In our example, the subject *Jane* performs a dual role insofar as it contributes *Jane* to both the official and the background propositions. Thus, an utterance like (16) embodies two sentences. It is for this reason that an utterance can express two or more distinct propositions and, I claim, be true even if one of these propositions is false.

A very similar representation can be proposed for an utterance with an epithet. Thus, for example, (12) above, “Jon, *the fool*, missed the train”, can be represented as in (12c)

(12) (c)



However, the picture I am assuming differs from Dever in one major aspect. While Dever follows Bach (1999) and Neale (1999) in claiming that both propositions expressed must be true in order for an utterance containing an appositive (or a complex demonstrative) to be judged to be true without hesitation, I argue that the background proposition does not affect the truth-value of the utterance. Unlike Dever, Bach and Neale, I maintain that an utterance’s truth-value is inherited from the official proposition only.

As further support of the thesis that an utterance containing an epithet or a parenthetical has the same truth-conditions as an utterance just like it but stripped of the parenthetical, we can focus on utterances such as “Snow is white” and “Snow is white, I claim”, or “Since it is Jon’s birthday, he will host a party” and “Since it is Jon’s birthday, he will host a party, I suppose”. If either pair of utterances is produced in the same context (the same agent, time, place and possible world), each utterance would have the same truth-conditions, i.e. that snow is white or that, since it is Jon’s birthday, he will host a party. The parenthetical *I claim*, like the parenthetical *I suppose*, does not affect the truth-value of the whole utterance. *I* and *claim*, however, do

not lack a semantic value; their semantic value simply does not affect the truth-value of the utterance. Furthermore, the FORCE with which an appositive, a parenthetical or an epithet is put forward may well differ from the force of the main clause. One can ask, for instance, “Is Jane, the best doctor in town, already married?” or “Did Jon, the idiot, miss his train?”. The main clause is interrogative, while the subordinate clause is assertoric. Such data should reinforce the view that the subordinate clause cannot and should not be treated on a par with the main clause and, thus, that the official proposition and the background proposition cannot be treated equally. Besides, a parenthetical, an appositive or an epithet can also be used in an ironic, humorous or sarcastic way, as, for example, *the man of peace* in “Ariel Sharon, the man of peace, is a war criminal”.¹³

The main objection faced by the multiple-proposition picture I propose can be stated as follows. One could argue that we cannot infer from the communicative intuition the semantic fact that the background and official propositions should not be treated on a par. When we come to SEMANTICS, it could be argued, both propositions should be true for the utterance expressing them to be true. However, consider the following argument:

(28) (a) Jon, the fool, missed the train.

So: (b) Jon is a fool.

If this argument is valid, then it is simply impossible for the premise (28a) to be true and the conclusion false. The view I am proposing, however, entails that this inference is INVALID. Since I claim that the truth-condition of (28a) is inherited from the truth-condition of the official proposition, regardless of the truth-condition of the background proposition, then it would be possible for (28a) to be true and yet (28b) to be false (insofar as the truth-condition of the latter depends on the truth-condition of the background proposition).

The solution to this objection (see Corazza 2002b) goes as follows. The alleged validity of arguments of this sort parallels the alleged validity of the following argument:

(29) (a) All men are mortal.

So: (b) Socrates is mortal.

This argument is, without doubt, invalid. Yet in everyday conversation, we encounter utterances such as, “If all individuals dislike war, Mary dislikes

[13] One could object that we cannot, from this communicative intuition alone, infer the SEMANTIC fact that the background and the official propositions are not to be treated equally. This kind of objection arises from a clear-cut distinction between semantics and pragmatics. If, however, one rejects the existence of such a clear-cut distinction and assumes that semantics is pragmatically informed, then this objection does not arise. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Corazza (2004a: Introduction).

war”. Inferences such as (29) and conditionals like this one are understood on the background of a hidden or tacit premise (in this case, the premise that Mary is an individual and not, say, a pet). In an everyday conversation the tacit premise can be understood as a presupposition, as a background proposition that a speaker and her audience take for granted in a linguistic interchange. From a logical viewpoint, though, we must make this premise explicit. Thus, an argument like (29) must be rephrased as in (30).

- (30) (a) All men are mortal.
 (b) **Socrates is a man.**

So: (c) Socrates is mortal.

A similar story can be told about (28). Its alleged validity is suggested by a ‘tacit’ premise, i.e., by the clause expressing the background proposition.¹⁴ For (28) to be valid, it should read as (31).

- (31) (a) Jon, the fool, missed the train.
 (b) **Jon is a fool.**

So: (c) Jon is a fool.

In (31) the EXPLICIT premise “Jon is a fool” expresses what the epithet expresses in an utterance such as (28a), i.e. the background proposition.¹⁵

Moreover, the fact that, in an utterance containing a parenthetical, an appositive or an epithet, the speaker’s main goal is to convey the official proposition can be emphasized further by focusing on the natural way one would report such utterances. I call this the REPORTING TEST. The test should capture our intuition about what is said, i.e. what a speaker primarily commits herself to in uttering a given sentence. In reporting what one says with (32) and (33), it is not necessary to mention the background proposition.

- (32) Campbell, the famous supermodel, is gorgeous.
 (33) Jon, the idiot, missed the train.

If (32) and (33) are uttered by Ivan, one could correctly report:

- (34) Ivan said that Campbell is gorgeous.
 (35) Ivan said that Jon missed the train.

[14] I said “‘tacit’” premise because the premise is not tacit, strictly speaking. In a parenthetical, for instance, the relevant premise is present even if it does not affect the truth-value of the clause containing it. It is for this reason that for an argument like (28) to be valid, the clause expressing the background proposition must be made explicit and added. In so doing we make it clear that the truth-value of the clause expressing the background proposition is relevant to the validity of the argument.

[15] For a more detailed discussion of these inference-based criticisms and the way they can be handled, see Corazza (2002b).

These are perfectly appropriate reports. These reports relate the attributee, Ivan, to the official proposition and are true if and only if Ivan expressed the latter, i.e. he uttered a sentence expressing this official proposition.¹⁶ Since the report's goal is to convey the official proposition, the subordinate clause disappears. If the reports were as in (36) and (37), the subordinate expressions (clauses, cf. (12c) above) would not be governed by the prefix *Ivan said that*.

(36) Ivan said that Campbell, the famous supermodel, is gorgeous.

(37) Ivan said that Jon, the idiot, missed the train.

Reports like (36) and (37) do not attribute saying “the famous supermodel” and “the idiot” to Ivan. In these reports, the subordinate expressions are used by the ATTRIBUTER, i.e. the subordinate clauses are transparent. It is for this reason that the background proposition must be dropped in a report. This data helps to emphasize how epithets must be viewed as SPEAKER-ORIENTED presuppositions and, as such, they are transparent and contribute to *de re* attributions. These reports do not suggest that Ivan ACTUALLY UTTERED these, or similar, words; they do not relate Ivan to the background proposition. To do that job, the reports should be:

(38) Ivan said that Campbell is a famous supermodel **and that** she is gorgeous.

(39) Ivan said that Jon is an idiot **and that** he missed the train.

These reports suggest that Jon actually made two distinct utterances.¹⁷ So far the contention is that utterances like (32) and (33) express two distinct propositions, which cannot be treated on a par. As we shall see in the final section, reports with epithets behave like reports with parentheticals.

[16] For the sake of simplicity, I intentionally ignore the *de re* vs. *de dicto* distinction and assume that these reports are *de re*. Thus, they are true if and only if they relate the attributee to the proposition she expresses, regardless on the wording (the *dicta*) the attributee uses to express it.

[17] If one adopts a ‘narrow’ view of semantics, one can claim that the speaker’s commitments and goals in reporting utterances with parentheticals, non-restrictive relative clauses and the like can be accounted for in terms of pragmatic features. Indeed, if one holds that the official proposition and the background proposition must be treated on a par, one can claim that reports like (28) and (29) are incomplete and that the accurate reports of (32) and (33) should be (38) and (39). Since I do not believe that the speaker’s commitments can be explained merely as pragmatic facts, I hold that (34) and (35) are the accurate reports of (32) and (33), and that the reports in (38) and (39) fail to capture Jon’s communicative aim. I concede that the reporting test may not constitute a compelling and definitive argument in favor of the picture I propose, but if one accepts, as I do, that semantics should also handle a speaker’s commitments and communicative intentions, then the reporting test provides further evidence in favor of the idea that the background proposition and the official propositions should not be treated (semantically) on a par.

3. EPITHETS AS ANAPHORS

I now turn to discuss how epithets can be anaphoric. An expression e is anaphoric with respect to an expression a if the semantic value of e is determined, at least partially, by the semantic value of a and a does not belong to e (a is said to be the antecedent of e). For the sake of argument we can assume the following distinction between an anaphoric use of a singular term and a deictic use of a singular term. While anaphors presuppose that their referent has already been introduced into the universe of discourse, deictic uses are ways to introduce new items. The notion of anaphora I have in mind transcends the syntactic constraints spelled out by the Government and Binding Theory (GB), insofar as I accept intersentential anaphora.¹⁸ In “Jane₁ played poker. She₁ lost a lot of money” and “Jon₁ married Jane last year. The bastard₁ ran away with a model after two weeks” the pronoun *she* and the epithetical NP *the bastard* are both intersentential anaphors but they cannot be accounted for by syntax alone. In particular, intersentential anaphors do not obey Principle A of the Binding Theory, whichever way one spells it out¹⁹ though I am not committed to the view that anaphoric pronouns must be bound. Under the label ANAPHORA I am happy to subsume all NPs which are REFERENTIALLY DEFECTIVE, regardless of whether or not they are bound.²⁰ Let us now consider (40)–(42).

[18] For a clear exposition of GB see Haegeman (1994: chapter 4). According to GB, anaphoric pronouns differ from the indexical use of pronouns because of the following three principles of the Binding Theory:

Principle A: Anaphors must be bound in their governing category.

Principle B: Pronouns must be free in their governing category.

Principle C: Other NPs must be free in all categories.

A governing category (GC) is defined as follows:

A is a GC for B if A is the minimal category (i.e. the smallest NP or S) containing B, a governor of B, and a subject accessible to B.

Roughly, the minimal GC is the S or the NP node immediately dominating the antecedent and the anaphor. The element which governs is called the GOVERNOR while the element that is governed is the GOVERNEE. A pronoun is BOUND if and only if it is c-commanded by a co-indexed element, while a pronoun is FREE if and only if it is not c-commanded by a coindexed element. C-command is defined as follows:

C-command

Node A c-commands node B iff:

- (i) A does not dominate B and B does not dominate A; and
- (ii) the first branching node dominating A also dominates B.

Modifications of these aspects of GB have been proposed (e.g. Pollard & Sag 1992).

[19] One modification of Principle A of Binding Theory is due to Pollard & Sag (1992: 263):

Every anaphor must be coindexed with a NP in an appropriately defined command relation, within an appropriately defined minimal syntactic domain.

The main questions (and disagreements) among syntacticians focus on how the command relation and the minimal syntactic domain should be specified. This debate, however, is beyond the scope of my paper.

[20] In short, any (good) theory of discourse anaphora should suit my argument.

- (40) (a) Mary₁ promised to come, but **she**₁ missed the train.
 (b) Mary₁ promised to come, but **the idiot**₁ missed the train.²¹
- (41) (a) Jon₁ and Joe₂ played poker all night and **they**_{1⊕2} lost all their money.
 (b) Jon₁ and Joe₂ played poker all night and **the idiots**_{1⊕2} lost all their money.
- (42) (a) Jon₁ saw Jane₂ and **he**₁ ignored **her**₂.
 (b) Jon₁ saw Jane₂ and **the bastard**₁ ignored **the sweetheart**₂.

In (40b), for instance, the epithet *the idiot* is anaphoric on *Mary* – its semantic value is inherited from the semantic value of *Mary*. In (40a), the pronoun *she* is merely an anaphoric pronoun, i.e. it goes proxy for its antecedent, *Mary* (it can be viewed as a pronoun of laziness).

As far as the phenomenon of anaphora is concerned, epithets do not seem to differ from definite descriptions. A sentence like “Mary₁ promised to come, but the unlikely girl₁ missed the train” has the same form as (40b). It is worth stressing, though, that there are some differences between epithets and descriptions *qua* anaphoric terms. In several contexts, the replacement of an epithet by a description renders the sentence ungrammatical:

- (43) (a) Ivan₁ was charmed by a priest who tried to sell the idiot₁ a new interpretation of the Bible.
 (b) *Ivan₁ was charmed by a priest who tried to sell the president₁ a new interpretation of the Bible.

Since the grammatical structures of (43a) and (43b) are identical and, therefore, no grammatical rule can be invoked to explain why one is acceptable and the other is not, discourse considerations must be taken into account.

One could object that in (40b), for instance, *the idiot* is a description and not an epithet; *the idiot* in (40b) would not differ from *the train* in (44).

- (44) Mary promises to come but **the train** was delayed.

If so, *the idiot* in (40b) is not an epithet and does not work like a parenthetical. As we saw at the beginning of section 1 above, the *New shorter*

[21] A similar example is found in Huang (2000: 48), who credits Lasnik (1989) with being the first to make the claim that epithets, unlike names, can take antecedents from preceding clauses and participate in left dislocation, on a par with pronominals, but not with names, as in “John, everyone thinks that he/the idiot should be demoted”. As far as I know, the first person to stress that epithets can work as anaphors was Jackendoff (1972: 110). The examples he proposes are, “I wanted Charlie to help me, but *the bastard* wouldn’t do it”, “Irving was besieged by a horde of bills and *the poor guy* couldn’t pay them”, “Although *the bum* tried to hit me, I can’t really get too mad at Harry”. Jackendoff writes, ‘These “pronominal epithets” can occur in some subset of the environment in which pronominalization is possible, and they function semantically more or less as specialized pronouns’ (Jackendoff 1972: 110).

Oxford Dictionary states that an epithet ‘is a word or phrase expressing an attribute or quality or regarded as characteristic of the person or thing mentioned; a significant appellation; a suitable descriptive term’. *The train* in (44) does not express or attribute a quality to the person mentioned, but *the idiot* in (40b) does attribute a quality to Mary, and to do so it must be viewed as coreferential with *Mary*. Hence, *the idiot* in (40b) and *the train* in (44) cannot be treated on a par. To be sure, one could claim that *the idiot* is coreferential with *Mary* and picks up Mary because the latter has been made salient. It thus works like a referring expression, i.e. an expression which does not inherit its value from an antecedent it is linked with. Actually, it would work like a definite description picking up the unique individual which, in the relevant domain, happens to be an idiot. I have some difficulty, though, in seeing how a definite description works in selecting an object previously made salient. To do this job the description should be understood to work in the referential way, i.e. to work like a singular term.²² I do not accept this interpretation. It seems to me that the epithetical nature of *the idiot* in (40b) forces its anaphoric reading. On the other hand, *the train* in (44) cannot be an epithet because it is not anaphoric on Sue.

It is for this very reason that I claim that the epithets in (40b), (41b) and (42b) are best understood as ATTRIBUTIVE ANAPHORS. The multiple-proposition view I proposed allows us to account for this phenomenon in an easy and elegant way. If (40a) were rendered as (40c), no information would be lost.

(40) (c) Mary₁ promised to come but **Mary**₁ missed the train.

(40c) is not as elegant as (40a), but it would say exactly the same thing: that Mary promised to come but she/Mary missed the train. On the other hand, if (40b) were replaced by (40c) or (40a), relevant information WOULD be lost: (40a), unlike (40b), does not state that Mary is an idiot. The epithet *the idiot* in (40b) plays a double role, an anaphoric role (it is anaphoric on and thus coreferential with *Mary*) and an attributive role (it attributes to the referent of its antecedent, Mary, the property of being an idiot). For this reason, I call an epithet like *the idiot* in (40b) an attributive anaphora. In other words, when epithets work like anaphoric pronouns, they are attributive anaphors. In (42b), for instance, *the bastard* is anaphoric on *Jon* and *the sweetheart* is anaphoric on *Jane*, and they attribute the property of being a bastard and being a sweetheart to Jon and Jane, respectively.

[22] The strategy of analyzing unbound anaphora as a referential expression referring to a previously made salient object was introduced by Kripke (1977) in his well-documented criticism of Donnellan’s referential vs. attributive distinction. It is somewhat ironic that if one appeals to this strategy to explain the anaphoric nature of an epithet, one ends up assuming that the epithet *qua* description should be understood as a singular term, i.e. a description used referentially.

It is worth stressing, though, that I am not claiming that no other account could be proposed in order to handle epithets *qua* attributive anaphors. One could claim, for instance, that the attributive nature of an epithet can be captured in distinguishing between the proposition expressed and the proposition communicated/imparted/conveyed/implicated/etc. That is, in claiming that an utterance like (40b) expresses the proposition THAT MARY PROMISED TO COME and communicates/imparts/conveys/implicates/etc. the proposition THAT MARY IS AN IDIOT. My point is a modest one and can be stated in a counterfactual way: if one accepts the multiple-proposition view I suggested, then one can easily deal with epithets *qua* attributive anaphors. On the other hand, if one rejects the multiple-proposition view I proposed, one is likely to adopt the Grice-inspired distinction between the proposition expressed and the proposition implicated in order to handle epithets *qua* attributive anaphors. A friend of the Gricean distinction could even claim that since we have independent reasons to accept the distinction between what is said (the proposition expressed) and what is communicated (the proposition implicated), then one need not appeal to the multiple-proposition view. Nevertheless, one cannot deny that the multiple-proposition view allows one to handle the examples I proposed in an elegant and easy way. In particular, it can easily account for the attributive feature of epithets. An utterance of (40b) above can be rendered as (40d) or, more accurately, as (40e).

- (40) (d) Mary₁ (the idiot) promised to come but **she**₁ missed the train.
 (e) Mary₁ promised to come but **she**₁ (the idiot) missed the train.

Both (40d) and (40e) express several propositions. They express the official propositions THAT MARY PROMISED TO COME and THAT MARY MISSED THE TRAIN and the background proposition THAT MARY IS AN IDIOT. The attributive feature of the epithet *the idiot* in (40b) contributes to the background proposition. (41b) would be analyzed as (41c).

- (41) (c) Jon₁ and Joe₂ played poker all night and **they**_{1⊕2} (the idiots) lost all their money.

It expresses the official propositions THAT JON AND JOE PLAYED POKER ALL NIGHT and THAT JON AND JOE LOST ALL THEIR MONEY, and the background proposition THAT JON AND JOE ARE IDIOTS.

In summary, the analysis I propose deals with attributive anaphora (such as epithets). When an epithet (or, for that matter, a description) works like an anaphora, there is an implicit argument at work, which takes charge of the anaphoric link. This implicit argument can be seen to work like a bound variable. Hence the analysis of an utterance like (40b) above should be as in (40f).

- (40) (f) Mary₁ promised to come but the idiot(**x**₁) missed the train.

The same analysis can be proposed for quantified utterances. Thus, (45a) is analyzed as in (45b):

- (45) (a) All the students₁ promised to come, but the idiots₁ missed the train.
 (b) All the students₁ promised to come, but the idiots(x₁) missed the train.

The underlying structure of (45b) can be represented as in (45).

- (45) (c) $\forall x$ [x is a student \rightarrow (x promised to come & idiot(x) missed the train)].

The same story can be told for the examples in (46).

- (46) (a) Jon blames **each orator**₁ in private while praising **him**₁ in public.
 (b) Jon blames **each orator**₁ in private while praising **the charlatan**₁ in public.

The underlying structure of (46b) can be represented as:

- (46) (c) $\forall x$ [x is an orator \rightarrow (Jon blames x in private & Jon praises charlatan(x) in public)].

This regimentation is inspired by Heim's (1983) solution to the donkey sentences. Consider a sentence such as (47a) and its representation in (47b).


- (47) (a) If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.
 (b) $\exists x$ {farmer(x) & $\exists y$ [donkey(y) & own(x,y)]} \rightarrow beats(x,y)

Given this representation, we have the problem that the variables x and y occur freely in the consequent. To solve this problem (the binding problem), Heim proposes to analyze conditionals as presenting an implicit universal quantifier. According to this suggestion, the transformation should be as in (47c).


- (47) (c) $\forall x \forall y$ {[farmer(x) & donkey(y) & own(x,y)] \rightarrow beats(x,y)}.

Here the antecedent acts as a restrictive term and the consequent is the predicate.²³ We would thus have the following representation:

[23] For a different account see Neale (1990), who argues that the anaphoric model may not be the best model and that so-called unbound anaphors (like *it* in the donkey-sentence in (47a)) are best understood as pronouns referring to an individual previously brought to salience.



In this diagram, P is the antecedent and Q the consequent. This kind of analysis can be easily applied to utterances containing epithets working as anaphoric pronouns. (45a) could thus be represented as the following structure.



A representation like this makes it clear that the information that *x* is an idiot is encapsulated in another sentence, S_2 , an utterance of which would express the background proposition, while the official propositions are expressed by S_1 . Yet *x* in S_2 is bound. This analysis also captures the intuitive reading, suggested by (45a), that all the students are characterized as idiots. Considering the representation of (46b), in (46c) above, the epithet *the charlatan* directly attaches to the bound variable. This information comes as an aside, as added information. This should capture the idea I put forward

according to which an epithet contributes only in the expression of the background proposition(s). It will be recalled that I have argued that background propositions should be viewed in the same way as presuppositions. The difference between a background proposition and a presupposition is that the former, unlike the latter, is not tacitly entailed but stated by the utterance. Semantically, however, presuppositions and background propositions should be treated on a par. Thus, any account of presupposition and accommodation could be applied to the anaphoric use of epithets. Hence, the main theses presented so far – i.e. that the multiple-proposition view allows us to capture the nature of epithets and that anaphoric epithets should be viewed as attributive anaphors – should be neutral regarding a specific theory of unbounded anaphora, E-type pronouns, and so on.

4. EPITHETS VS. QUASI-INDICATORS

I now turn to discuss an attempt to dismiss the view that epithets can work as anaphoric pronouns. The attempt I have in mind is found in Lasnik (1976). According to this view, epithets in utterances like (4), “Jane₁ said that she would come, but *the idiot*₁ will probably miss the train” are best viewed as descriptions referring to an individual previously made salient.²⁴ This position focuses on the fact that, in many cases, an anaphoric interpretation of the epithet makes the utterance ungrammatical:

(48) *Malvin₁ claims that **the bastard**₁ was honest.

(49) *John₁ thinks that I admire **the idiot**₁.

On the basis of examples like these, Lasnik argues that epithets are not anaphoric pronouns at all, but referential expressions. According to Lasnik (cf. 1976: 93), the ungrammaticality of (48) and (49) parallels the ungrammaticality of (50)–(53).

(50) *Oscar finally realized that Oscar was unpopular.

(51) *It surprised John that John was so well liked.

(52) *Harry was really surprised that Harry lost the race.

(53) *Nixon hates people who criticize Nixon.

The ungrammaticality of these examples comes from the fact that the second NPs are bound. From this Lasnik concludes that epithets, like referential expressions, cannot be bound. To illustrate this point further, let us contrast the ungrammaticality of (50)–(53) with the grammaticality of (54)–(57).

[24] This view comes close to a view of unbound anaphora defended by Kripke (1977) and Lewis (1979).

- (54) Oscar finally realized that he was unpopular.
 (55) It surprised John that he was so well liked.
 (56) Harry was really surprised that he lost the race.
 (57) Nixon hates people who criticize him.

(54)–(57) are grammatical because pronouns, unlike proper names, can be bound. In (54), for instance, *he* is bound by *Oscar*. Hence, according to Lasnik, epithets are FREE IN THEIR GOVERNING CATEGORY (cf. fn 18 above). Thus, epithets are not anaphoric and, as far as coreference is concerned, they should be understood in a similar way to pronouns like *they* in (58).

- (58) After John talked to Mary, they left the room.

Since there is no single NP designating John and Mary in (58), no formulation of a transformational rule linking *they* to *John* and *Mary* can account for the coreferentiality of *they* with *Mary + John*. But this is not a problem, for ‘no coreference rule is needed to explain [(58)], because there is nothing to explain. *They* in [(58)] can be used to refer to any group of entities; under many discourse situations, however, John and Mary are the only likely candidates’ (Lasnik 1976: 98f.).²⁵

Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998) challenge Lasnik’s prediction and show that epithets can be bound:

- (59) John₁ ran over a man (who was) trying to give **the idiot**₁ directions.
 (60) Through a number of slipups, John₁ (inadvertently) led his students to conclude that **the idiot**₁ couldn’t teach.

In (59), for instance, *the idiot* is both c-commanded and coindexed with *John*. It is, therefore, bound by *John*. On the basis of these data, Dubinsky & Hamilton argue that the ungrammaticality of (50)–(53) is not triggered by Principle C, i.e. by the fact that referring terms must be free in all categories. This contrasts with pronouns (which must be free in their governing category) and anaphors (which must be bound in their governing category). The ungrammaticality comes from the fact that ‘the non-local antecedent is the perspective-bearer (i.e. one from whose perspective the attributive content of the epithets is evaluated)’, while the grammaticality of (59) and (60) is granted ‘precisely because the antecedent of the epithet is not the perspective-bearer. Put differently, epithets are antilogophoric’ (Dubinsky & Hamilton 1998: 687).

It is worth noting at this point that logophoric pronouns are used to refer to the person who the person whose attitudes are being reported thinks s/he

[25] It is worth noting that in his 1989 paper, Lasnik recognizes that epithets can be pronominal as well. They are thus subject to both Principle C and Principle B of the Binding Theory. Thus, epithets are both pronominal and referential. This modification of Lasnik’s original view does not affect my argument.

is.²⁶ Pure logophoric languages are those in which these pronouns are used ONLY as logophors (i.e. neither as other reflexives nor as emphatic pronouns).²⁷ In other words, logophoricity characterizes the phenomenon of reporting the perspective or the point of view of an internal protagonist of a sentence or discourse, as opposed to that of the current, external speaker. Logophoric pronouns are intrinsically indirect-discourse or reportive pronouns – they appear in attitude ascriptions. In some languages (mainly West African languages, e.g. Ewe, Fon Bwamu and Tabury), there are specific pronouns which are exclusively used to attribute to someone an egocentric perspective. In Tabury, for instance, there is a distinction between the third-person pronoun which is an anaphoric pronoun, *à*, and the third-person pronoun *qua* logophoric pronoun, *sé* (see Hagége 1974: 299):

- (61) (a) á Dík lí māy mà:gā à kó n sú: mònò.
 ‘He₁ thinks of the young girl that he₁ saw yesterday.’
 (b) á Dík lí māy mà:gā sé kó n sú: mònò.
 ‘He₁ thinks of the young girl that he₁ (himself) saw yesterday.’

Having said that, we can now stress that epithets are antilogophoric. This thesis is strengthened by examples like those in (62)–(64), in which each (a) sentence is ungrammatical precisely because the epithet’s antecedent is the perspective-bearer.

- (62) (a) *It was said by John₁ that the idiot₁ lost a thousand dollars on the slots.
 (b) It was said of John₁ that the idiot₁ lost a thousand dollars on the slots.
 (63) (a) *According to John₁, the idiot₁ is married to a genius.
 (b) Speaking of John₁, the idiot₁ is married to a genius.
 (64) (a) *John₁ told us of a man (who was) trying to give the idiot₁ directions.
 (b) John₁ ran over a man (who was) trying to give the idiot₁ directions.

These examples show, *pace* Lasnik, that ‘epithets are not subject to condition C and must be bound by nonlocal antecedents so long as antilogophoricity is respected’ (Dubinsky & Hamilton 1998: 688). This is in direct contrast with referential expressions such as proper names and unbound descriptions, for example:

[26] In these kinds of situations we face a context switch. When a reporter uses a logophoric pronoun or a quasi-indicator to attribute an egocentric thought to someone, the reporter assumes the perspective of the attributee. I discuss the general phenomenon of perspective switch involved in attitude ascriptions in Corazza (2004a: chapter 7 in particular).

[27] As Culy points out: ‘In pure logophoric languages, there are always environments in which corefering with the logophoric trigger can only be done by a logophoric pronoun’ (Culy 1994a: 1080). More on logophoric pronouns and how quasi-indicators should be understood as logophoric pronouns in section 5 below.

- (65) *John₁ ran over a man who was trying to give **the president₁** directions.
 (66) *Through a number of slipups, **the teacher₁** inadvertently led his students to conclude that John₁ couldn't teach.

Moreover, like logophoric pronouns, epithets cannot be bound locally:

- (67) *John₁ shaved **the idiot₁**.
 (68) *John₁ embarrassed **the idiot₁**.

Thus, the counterexamples proposed by Lasnik do not jeopardize the view that epithets can be anaphoric (cf. (50)–(53) above).

As I suggested at the beginning of this article, the thesis that epithets can act as anaphoric pronouns is best defended through an analysis of epithets along the way in which we analyze quasi-indicators. In a series of classic papers, Castañeda (1966, 1967, 1968) claims that the only way to attribute an indexical thought is by means of a quasi-indicator. From a third-person perspective, for instance, a use of the first-person pronoun can be attributed, in English, only by using expressions like *she herself*, *he himself*, etc. Castañeda creates an artificial pronoun, *s/he**, to represent the (possibly implicit) use of the first-person pronoun in an attitude ascription: “Sue says that she* is rich” represents Sue as saying “I am rich”. *S/he** goes proxy for *s/he her/himself*. These artificial pronouns are called QUASI-INDICATORS and, Castañeda claims, are the only mechanism enabling the attribution of indexical reference from the third-person perspective. They are, therefore, the only tools that allow us to capture someone's egocentric perspective. It is an accident of English that a single pronoun *s/he* can play very different logical roles and thus can be used to perform very different speech acts. In an *oratio recta* construction, it works as a demonstrative while in an *oratio obliqua* construction, it can work either as a demonstrative, a bound variable, an anaphoric pronoun or a quasi-indicator:

It is a mere accident of grammar that the same physical objects are used in different logical roles. The underlying rationale is this: Indicators are a primary means of referring to particulars, but the references made with them are personal and ephemeral; quasi-indicators are the derivative means of making an indexical reference both interpersonal and enduring, yet preserving it intact. (Castañeda 1967 [1989: 207])

The examples in (69)–(72) illustrate the different logical roles that the pronoun *she* can play when embedded in an attitude ascription.

- (69) Jane₁ said that **she₂** [pointing to Mary] is rich. (demonstrative use)
 (70) Jane₁ said that **she₁** is rich, but she did not know that she herself was rich. (anaphoric use)
 (71) Jane₁ said that **she₁** herself (**she*₁**) is rich. (quasi-indexical use)
 (72) Every woman₁ will tell a man that **she₁** is in love with him. (bound variable use)

It has been shown that the third-person reflexive can be long-distance bound (see Reinhart & Reuland 1991: 312):

- (73) Jon₁ said that the paper was written by (Ann and) **himself**₁.
 (74) Clara₁ found time ... to check (that) apart from **herself**₁ ... there was a man from the BBC.

Reflexive pronouns can thus be viewed as anaphors not captured by the Binding Theory.²⁸ Quasi-indicators *qua* reflexive pronouns should be viewed along the same lines because (i) they are reflexive, (ii) they are anaphoric and (iii) they may not obey Principle A of the Binding Theory. I am now in a position to suggest that the best (and more promising) way of understanding quasi-indicators is along the lines of logophoric pronouns. Quasi-indicators do in English (and in other non-logophoric languages) what logophoric pronouns do in logophoric languages. It is worth quoting Castañeda:

[W]e shall be concerned almost exclusively with third-person statements that ascribe self-knowledge to others, like

- (3) The Editor of *Soul* knows that he (himself) is a millionaire, and
 (4) The Editor of *Soul* knows that Mary knows that her niece knows that he (himself) is a millionaire.

In these cases the attribution of self-knowledge is made by means of the third-person pronoun *he* (*himself*) to be abbreviated *he**, which has here the following characteristics:

- (i) it does not express an indexical reference made by the speaker;
 (ii) it appears in *oratio obliqua*;
 (iii) it has an antecedent, namely *the Editor of Soul*, to which it refers back;
 (iv) its antecedent is outside the *oratio obliqua* containing *he**;
 (v) *he** is used to attribute, so to speak, implicit indexical reference to the Editor of *Soul*;

that is, if the Editor were to assert what, according to (3) and (4), he knows, he would use the indicator *I* where we, uttering (3) and (4), have used *he**: he would assert, respectively,

[28] It is also worth noting that the first- and second-person reflexive can occur without an antecedent (see Reinhart & Reuland 1991: 311):

- (i) This paper was written by Anne and **myself**.
 (ii) Apart from **myself** only three members protested.
 (iii) Physicists like **yourself** are a godsend.

This contradicts the idea that reflexive pronouns must have an antecedent binding them. Hence, reflexive pronouns seem to escape strict grammatical rules. In particular, some uses do not obey Principle A of the Binding Theory. Other examples of ungoverned reflexives are provided by so-called picture-noun reflexives (see e.g. Pollard & Sag 1992):

- (i) The picture of **herself**₁ on the front page of *The Times* confirmed the allegations that Mary₁ had been making for years.
 (ii) John₁ was furious. A picture of **himself**₁ in the museum has been mutilated.

- (3a) I am a millionaire, and
 (4a) Mary knows that her niece knows that I am a millionaire.²⁹
 (Castañeda 1968: 44of.)

It should come as no surprise that Castañeda's characterization of quasi-indicators mirrors Clements' characterization of logophoric pronouns:

Logophoric pronouns can be characterized cross-linguistically in the following way:

- (i) logophoric pronouns are restricted to *reportive contexts* transmitting the words or thought of an individual or individuals other than the speaker or narrator;
- (ii) the antecedent does not occur in the same reportive context as the logophoric pronoun;
- (iii) the antecedent designates the individual or individuals whose words or thoughts are transmitted in the reportive context in which the logophoric pronoun occurs. (Clements 1975: 171f.)

The main features of quasi-indicators and logophoric pronouns are as follows:

- (i) they appear in *oratio obliqua*,³⁰
- (ii) they are referentially dependent and as such cannot be used deictically—they are intrinsically syncategorematic terms,
- (iii) their semantic value depends on the noun phrase which they are linked to (coindexed with),
- (iv) they attribute an indexical reference to the referent of the antecedent with which they are coindexed.

The main idea is that quasi-indicators contribute to the attribution of an indexical thought. The quasi-indicator *s/he**, for example, participates in a *de se* attribution and for this very reason cannot be replaced *salva veritate* by its antecedent. Thus *s/he** cannot be viewed as a mere pronoun of laziness. Actually, ascriptions like:

- (75) Jane believes that she* is rich.
 (76) Jane believes that Jane is rich.

Cannot be regarded as equivalent because (76) does not attribute to Jane an *I*-thought, i.e. it is not *de se*. The same can be said for an ascription such as (77).

- (77) Jane said that she is rich, but she does not know that she* is rich.

It reports a situation in which Jane referred to herself with a coreferring term, without realizing that she referred to herself. She may have said, "Jane

[29] For a similar, and more specific, characterization, see Castañeda (1967 [1989: 218ff.]).

[30] '[L]ogophoric pronouns are a type of indirect-discourse pronoun ... logophoric pronouns have a natural place in the typology of indirect discourse' (Culy 1997: 851).

is rich” but, being amnesiac, did not know that she is Jane and thus that she herself is rich.

Quasi-indicators seem to play the very same role in non-logophoric languages as logophoric pronouns play in logophoric languages. For this reason, it is also instructive to mention that cross-linguistic studies show that there seems to be a universal hierarchy of predicates licensing logophoric pronouns:

Licensing hierarchy

Speech predicates (*say, ask, agree*) \Rightarrow epistemic predicates (*think, want*) \Rightarrow psychological predicates (*be happy, be proud*) \Rightarrow knowledge predicates (*know, see that*) \Rightarrow perspective predicates (predicate of direct perception *see*).³¹

According to this hierarchy, if in a given language a logophoric pronoun can be triggered by a perspective predicate, then it can also be triggered by a knowledge predicate, by a psychological predicate, by an epistemic predicate and by a speech predicate. On the other hand, in some languages only speech predicates can trigger a logophoric pronoun.³² The fact that the logocentric triggers are verbs of psychological attitudes suggests that the natural niche of logophoric pronouns is to be found in the context of attitude ascriptions, i.e. logophoric pronouns usually appear within the scope of a *that*-clause. This hierarchy may help us understand why in English (as in many Romance languages) it is more difficult to find quasi-indicators when reporting perceptual acts. Consider Jane saying (78).

(78) That car is my favorite.

We may report her utterance with (78a).

(78) (a) Jane said that that car was her favorite.

In this report, though, we do not seem to attribute a specific way of referring to the relevant car with *that car*. We do not capture Jane’s perspective. That is, *that car* is not a quasi-indicator and a report like (78a) seems to be *de re*. Thus, (78a) is equivalent to (78b).

(78) (b) Of that car, Jane said that it was her favorite.

If we wanted to capture Jane’s perspective, we would end up with a rather complicated report of the form in (78c).

(78) (c) Jane said that the car she perceived/saw/ ... was her favorite.

[31] See Stirling (1993), Culy (1994a) and Huang (1994).

[32] ‘In Donno So (an African language), there are only two principal classes of predicates which license logophoric pronouns: speech predicates ... and thought predicates. The uncommon expression “hear from X that” also allows logophoric pronouns. Verbs of knowledge do not license logophoric pronouns as they do in some other languages (for example Ewe, cf. Clements 1975), nor do predicates of emotion’ (Culy 1994b: 119).

In that case, Jane's perspective is captured by the clause *she perceived/saw/...*, where *she* should be understood as a quasi-indicator.

Having listed the relevant logophoricity-licensing predicates, we can now appreciate that epithets are best understood against the background of quasi-indicators or, to borrow Dubinsky & Hamilton's (1998) terminology, against the background of antilogophoric pronouns. The examples in (79) illustrate this fact. The presence of the quasi-indicator *he himself* makes the sentence grammatical, whereas a substitution of an epithet for the quasi-indicator makes it ungrammatical.

- (79) (a) Jon₁ said that **he himself**₁ is rich.
 (b) *Jon₁ said that **the idiot**₁ is rich.
 (c) Jon₁ asked Jane whether **he himself**₁ is rich.
 (d) *Jon₁ asked Jane whether **the idiot**₁ is rich.
 (e) Jon₁ told Jane that he₁ wonders whether **he himself**₁ is rich.
 (f) *Jon₁ told Jane that he₁ wonders whether **the idiot**₁ is rich.
 (g) After last night's lottery draw, Jon₁ thinks that **he himself**₁ is rich.
 (h) *After last night's lottery draw, Jon₁ thinks that **the idiot**₁ is rich.
 (i) Jon₁ may not know that **he himself**₁ is rich.
 (j) *Jon₁ may not know that **the idiot**₁ is rich.

These examples suggest that a quasi-indicator must appear within the scope of a logophoric predicate, whereas an epithet may not. The general structures in which quasi-indicators and epithets can appear can be summarized as follows:

- NP₁ + logophoric predicate + QUASI-INDICATOR₁ + VP
- NP₁ + antilogophoric predicate + EPITHET₁ + VP

If we consider a factual predicate, for instance, an epithet can work as an anaphoric pronoun, but if a quasi-indicator is substituted for the epithet, the sentence becomes ungrammatical. In such cases, illustrated in (80), the epithet works like an attributive anaphora.

- (80) (a) John₁ ran over a man (who was) trying to give **the idiot**₁ directions.
 (b) *John₁ ran over a man (who was) trying to give **he himself**₁ directions.
 (c) Through a number of slipups, John₁ (inadvertently) led his students to conclude that **the idiot**₁ couldn't teach.
 (d) *Through a number of slipups, John₁ (inadvertently) led his students to conclude that **him himself**₁ couldn't teach.

If we understand epithets against the background of quasi-indicators, it emerges that (i) they are attributive anaphors and (ii) they cannot participate in the same kind of attributions as quasi-indicators. While a quasi-indicator like *s/he her/himself* contributes to a *de se* attribution, a logophoric pronoun contributes to a *de re* attribution. That is, a quasi-indicator *qua* attributive anaphora attributes an indexical thought to the referent of the NP from which it inherits its semantic value. An epithet *qua* attributive anaphora

stresses that the referent of the NP from which it inherits its value does not (or is not disposed to) accept the property that the speaker (the attributer) attributes to him/her in using the epithet; or at least, it is silent on the way the attributee characterizes (or is disposed to characterize) herself. To put it slightly differently, we can say that while quasi-indicators reveal the attributee's egocentric perspective, epithets reveal the reporter's perspective; it is because of this switch of perspective that the replacement of quasi-indicator by an epithet makes the resulting sentence ungrammatical. In sum, while quasi-indicators are intrinsically opaque, epithets are intrinsically transparent. To illustrate this feature, let us consider a report such as (81).

(81) Jane₁ said that **she**₁ would like to visit us but **the idiot**₁ was not sure if she could catch the last train.

Contrast this report with (82).

(82) Jane₁ said that **she**₁ would like to visit us but that **she herself**₁ was not sure if she could catch the last train.

In (81), the epithet *the idiot* does not attribute a specific way of making reference to Jane. It certainly does not suggest that she referred (or thought about) herself using *the idiot*. The epithet is used by the reporter to characterize Jane and, as such, it is transparent. On the other hand, *she herself* in (82) attributes to Jane an *I*-thought.³³ This is the main difference between

[33] In the case of multiple embedded sentences such as (i), Castañeda's position is that, although both occurrences of *she** have *Sue* as their antecedent, only the first occurrence depends on it immediately.

(i) (a) Sue₁ said that **she***₁ said that Jon said that **she***₁ is rich.

The second occurrence of *she** depends on the preceding occurrence; it is only because this first occurrence that the second *she** refers back to *Sue*. Since the first occurrence is separated from its antecedent by only one psychological prefix, Castañeda characterizes it an OCCURRENCE OF DEGREE 1. The second occurrence of *she** is separated from its antecedent by two psychological prefixes; it is thus an OCCURRENCE OF DEGREE 2. (ia) can thus be represented as in (ib).

(i) (b) Sue₁ said that [**she***₁ said that [Jon said that [**she***₁ is rich]]].

A report like this is silent on the way in which Jon referred to (and thought about) Sue. Jon may have said "You [addressing Sue] are rich", "Sue is rich", "The woman in this picture [pointing to a picture of Sue] is rich", etc. Castañeda claims that a quasi-indicator occurrence of degree 2 is analyzable via an occurrence of degree 1 and the occurrence of an existential quantifier ranging over possible ways of referring. It is because of this double embedding that (81) is grammatical. The epithet *the idiot* does not depend directly on *Sue*; rather, it directly depends on *she*. Actually a report (ic),

(i) (c) Sue₁ said that **the idiot**₁ said that Jon said that **she***₁ is rich.

is ungrammatical precisely because the epithet is directly connected to *Sue*, i.e. it is within the scope of the first psychological prefix and, as such, it would attribute to Sue her saying "the idiot".

	Quasi- indicator	Epithet	Simple anaphora
Anaphoric	+	+	+
Attributive	+	+	–
Logophoric	+	–	–

Table 1

epithets and quasi-indicators *qua* attributive anaphors. Epithets are intrinsically transparent while quasi-indicators are intrinsically opaque.

5. CONCLUSION

The main differences between epithets, quasi-indicators and simple anaphors discussed in the course of the present article are summarized in table 1.

I hope to have demonstrated that:

- epithets can be easily accommodated within a multiple-proposition framework;
- epithets can work as anaphoric pronouns and, like quasi-indicators, are best viewed as ATTRIBUTIVE anaphors;
- when epithets *qua* anaphors appear in an *oratio obliqua* construal they are, unlike quasi-indicators, transparent in that they do not attribute a property the attributee is likely to use in characterizing herself;
- unlike quasi-indicators, epithets *qua* anaphors are antilogophoric in that they are coreferential with a NP referring to an agent who is not the perspective-bearer of the attribution;
- epithets and quasi-indicators rest on, and help to emphasize, the *de se* vs. *de re* distinction.

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