Location games
Continuous strategy sets v discrete strategy sets
Best response functions
Dominance, IRSDS, and rationalizable strategies
Specification of transportation costs
Line v circle
Optimality
Use in voting concepts
Examples
Ch. 9 Q4, Ch. 10 Q7
Partnership or team games
Conflict over share and complementarity over total
Examples
Partnership game discussed in Chapter 8
Partnership game, dominance and rationalizable strategies, and optimal
ownership
Ch. 8 Q 3 as an example.
Oligopoly games
Ch 8 Q 5
Congruous strategy profile sets X = (X_{1},X_{2}, … ,X_{n})
with X_{i} in S_{i}, i = 1,2, … ,n
Weakly congruous
Discuss the normal game depicted on p. 82.
Best response complete
Congruous
Nash equilibriumweak and strong
Contributors to a convergence of belief by each player on a strategy
profile
IRSDS (a Nash equilibria must be an element of the
rationalizable strategies, common cultural influences, Pareto dominance.
Problems in achieving congruity
Multiple Nash equilibria
Lack of common institutional or cultural background
Special difficulties with weak as compared to strong NE
Historical influences and costs of changing to a superior equilibrium
(QWERTY, Beta and VHS, etc.—Watson calls this the specter of inefficient
coordination).
Calculating Nash equilibria
Normal games with finite strategies
Example from Ch. 6 Q 1(b)

L

C

R

U

5,9

0,1

4,1

M

3,2

0,9

1,1

D

2,8

0,1

8,4

Games with continuous strategy spaces
Examples
Partnership games (discussed above)
Cournot competition both with homogeneous and with differentiated goods
Bertrand competition with differentiated products (Q8 and Q9 on p. 93)
Crime and law enforcement efforts Ch 10 Q4 and 6
Tariff games Ch 10 Q3
Games with discontinuous strategy spaces
Examples
Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods (Ch. 10)
Auction model of Ch 10 Q 5
Learning from experiments