Location games

Continuous strategy sets v discrete strategy sets

Best response functions

Dominance, IRSDS, and rationalizable strategies

Specification of transportation costs

Line v circle

Optimality

Use in voting concepts

Examples

Ch. 9 Q4, Ch. 10 Q7

Partnership or team games

Conflict over share and complementarity over total

Examples

Partnership game discussed in Chapter 8

Partnership game, dominance and rationalizable strategies, and optimal ownership

Ch. 8 Q 3 as an example.

Oligopoly games

Ch 8 Q 5

Congruous strategy profile sets X = (X1,X2, … ,Xn) with Xi in Si, i = 1,2, … ,n

Weakly congruous

Discuss the normal game depicted on p. 82.

Best response complete

Congruous

Nash equilibrium-weak and strong

Contributors to a convergence of belief by each player on a strategy profile

IRSDS (a Nash equilibria must be an element of the rationalizable strategies, common cultural influences, Pareto dominance.

Problems in achieving congruity

Multiple Nash equilibria

Lack of common institutional or cultural background

Special difficulties with weak as compared to strong NE

Historical influences and costs of changing to a superior equilibrium (QWERTY, Beta and VHS, etc.—Watson calls this the specter of inefficient coordination).

Calculating Nash equilibria

Normal games with finite strategies

Example from Ch. 6 Q 1(b)

                                               

 

L

C

R

U

5,9

0,1

4,1

M

3,2

0,9

1,1

D

2,8

0,1

8,4

 

 

 

 

 

Games with continuous strategy spaces

Examples

Partnership games (discussed above)
Cournot competition both with homogeneous and with differentiated goods
Bertrand competition with differentiated products (Q8 and Q9 on p. 93)
Crime and law enforcement efforts Ch 10 Q4 and 6
Tariff games Ch 10 Q3

Games with discontinuous strategy spaces

Examples

Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods (Ch. 10)
Auction model of Ch 10 Q 5

Learning from experiments