November 9, 1996




BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: BEYOND ELECTIONS
POLICY OPTIONS FOR CANADA


Summary Report of a Consultation

Sponsored by the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee
and the Parliamentary International Forum

Ottawa, Ontario
October 8, 1996







Steering Committee

Mihailo Crnobrnja
Robin Hay
Leanne Fischer
John Arch MacInnis
John Graham
Barbara Shenstone
Ron Gould
Gregory Wirick
Fen Hampson



INTRODUCTION

What follows is a summary report of a consultation on post-election Bosnia-Herzegovina held in Ottawa on October 8, 1996. The purpose of the consultation was to develop policy options for Canada that will promote peace and stability in the region and contribute to the continued implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. The participants at the consultation focused their efforts in three areas: democracy and the rule of law; security; and economic and social reconstruction (see attached agenda).

The meeting was attended by more than 100 participants from the government and non-governmental sector, including a number of distinguished Canadians and experts from abroad. Justice Richard Goldstone, the former Chief Prosecutor, International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, gave the opening address and Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy spoke to the participants and entertained questions prior to lunch.

The meeting lasted a full day and included three plenary sessions, in which specialists and practitioners addressed the above mentioned issues and vengaged in discussion with the participants. Following these plenary sessions, the participants broke into three working groups, each tasked with addressing one of the three conference themes: democracy and the rule of law, security in a post-election Bosnia, and economic and social reconstruction.

The working groups, which included a chair and rapporteur, were tasked with developing policy options or refining those that were identified in the plenary sessions. The rapporteurs reported on the results of their discussion at a working dinner that evening. The following week, the consultation organizers met with the chairs and rapporteurs to further refine the policy options that arose from the day's proceedings. This report is the end result of that process.

This consultation was the second of two meetings on Bosnia funded by the John Holmes Fund at the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development. Funding was also provided by the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation and the Howard Webster Foundation. The consultation was sponsored by the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee and the Parliamentary International Forum. It was organized by Professor Fen Hampson, Associate Director, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Gregory Wirick, Associate, Parliamentary Centre, and Robin Hay, Partner, Global Affairs Research Partners.

This report will be submitted to the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It includes an overview of the discussion on each theme and recommended policy options.


I) DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW


Overview

In Bosnia, elections with no deaths and no major incidents should be regarded as a significant success. At least for the short term, the elections also added a degree of stability to a volatile area. But there is a downside. Success would not have been possible without the willing and highly motivated cooperation of the three ruling parties. Their objectives were met: consolidating and legitimizing their ethnically based and authoritarian inclined political systems; crushing the opposition (especially in Muslim and Croat areas). In other words a success for elections, but not necessarily for democracy. It should also be noted that the elections would not have been so relatively unscathed by incident if the municipal elections had not been suspended.

Another irony of the process was that it served to cement the ethnic divisions created by the war. The principal aggressor and ethnic cleansing parties (SDS and HDZ) have secured votes of confidence.

The conflict was stopped only a year ago. Wounds are not healed. Passions and risks remain high. U.N. sanctions have been lifted and international leverage is declining. In the circumstances, should Canada keep its shoulder to the Bosnian wheel or should we walk away and redirect our energies to more promising areas of need?

In our view, Canada should remain committed to the Dayton concept and to its remodelling to meet evolving realities. So far Dayton has provided and IFOR has implemented a resilient cease fire. With determined and reasonably unified international will, a viable framework, in which peace can be preserved and rehabilitation pursued, should be possible.

Looking at Canadian involvement, it is important to note that the technical success of the election process would not have been possible without an experienced and dedicated Canadian contribution. However, in the overall picture, Canadian influence is small and we remain a marginal player in political and military issues. Membership in the Contact Group would confer more influence. Access to the Contact Group, however, will probably mean that Canada will have to put more chips on the table. (eg. a similarly-sized but better equipped and more combat versatile military contribution, an enhanced contribution to governance reform and police professionalization.)


Policy recommendations

Strengthening political parties

  • Canadian politicians, parliamentarians and appropriately experienced individuals could offer their services to help with party professionalization, including organization, campaigning, financing, etc.

  • In partnership with other countries, Canada should set up a "one-stop" shopping governance co-op in Bosnia Herzegovina to provide information and technical assistance on legislative and administrative processes (including human resources, electoral support, civic education, etc.)

  • Canada and its allies should avoid forcing the democracy timetable where undue acceleration could be counterproductive.

  • Canada should encourage Bosnians to use political party agents at polling stations and assist in their training.

  • Canada should assist in the development of a domestic NGO capacity, or public agency, to oversee fair and free elections.

  • Canada should invite political party representatives to come to Canada on study tours.


    Civic education

  • Canada should support mediation initiatives and send Canadian mediators to Bosnia if requested.

  • Canada should encourage Bosnians to incorporate democratic ideals in their school curriculum, assist in training teachers, and help organize democracy simulations for students (similar to a Canadian program in which high school students come to Ottawa to hold a mock Parliament).

  • Canada should support the development of a free and independent media by providing information and guidance, as well as organizing media seminars, media exchanges and other initiatives.

  • Canada should support inter-ethnic initiatives.


    Legal apparatus

  • Canada should ensure that high priority is given to further development of the ombudsman system which is an important part of low-level legal aid.

  • Canada should provide professional help to the Bosnian government to develop a legal aid system.

  • Canada should continue to implement specific elements of the Dayton Accord which relate to an independent judiciary.


    Professionalization of police forces

  • Canada should work with other countries to further develop the work of the International Police Task Force.

  • Canada should develop a roster of qualified people who could provide human rights training.

  • Canada should assist in the development of an early warning system for human rights abuses.


    II) THE SECURITY DIMENSION


    Overview

    There was consensus on the security panel that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains critical. Fighting between Serbs, Muslims and Croats ceased after the signing of the Dayton agreement, but a recurrence of hostilities is not improbable. The fact that Bosnia consists essentially of three "statelets" which are heavily armed, economically devastated, and authoritarian in nature, does not bode well for Bosnia's future. The absence of justice --exemplified most clearly by the slow repatriation of refugees and the non-arrests of indicted war criminals -- means that the potential for conflict is high.

    According to the panellists, there are four areas of security where policy-makers should focus their attention: military security, arms control, police, and individual security. Bosnia's military security will require a re- examination of the IFOR structure and mandate, while ensuring that a substantial military force remains for at least the next two years. Regional arms control agreements signed in Vienna in June 1996 will continue to be monitored by the OSCE, and the International Police Task Force (IPTF) will likely expand its work in the area of human rights monitoring, training and police restructuring. The individual security of Bosnians, however, rests in the hands of the three governing parties.



    Policy recommendations

    IFOR mandate

  • Canada should encourage and support an extension of the IFOR mandate until after the next elections in 1998, stressing the fact that it will take at least two years to establish the basis upon which a durable peace can be built.

  • Canada should encourage the United States to maintain a ground force component in the IFOR structure. U.S. troops are key to preserving the credibility of IFOR and the Dayton Accord.

  • Canada should recommend a broader and more flexible mandate for IFOR-2 to allow greater leeway for commanders at the local level in conflict prevention and damage control. IFOR should increase its capacity for tracking down and arresting indicted war criminals.

  • IFOR's mandate should strengthen support to the OSCE in overseeing regional stabilization agreements. It should ensure that any equipping or training of military forces fall within the limits imposed by these agreements.

  • Canada should recommend a more aggressive arms control regime under the OSCE with stronger supervision, improved inspection mechanisms and on- site verification stations. Canadian involvement in such a regime should be considered.

  • IFOR should also support enhanced confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) under the direction of the OSCE. Canada could take the lead in providing experienced personnel and in carrying out specific measures.

  • IFOR's mandate should strengthen its cooperation with the IPTF in providing security and monitoring human rights. Both mandates should be extended for another two years.

  • Canada should support expanded demising activities in Bosnia Herzegovina - including support for the Mine Action Centre in Sarajevo - as well as continue to take the lead on the signing of an international treaty banning all landmines.


    Diplomatic initiatives

  • In recognizing the importance of Belgrade and Zagreb to the future of Bosnia Herzegovina, the international community should continue to apply pressure on Tudjman and Milosevic to prevent interference or encouragement of secessionist movements. The use of a series of carrots and sticks - foreign aid, trade and membership in international organizations - should be reinforced in order to urge Serbia and Croatia to cooperate, including on the issue of war crimes.

  • Canada should recommend the launching of an information campaign to convince Bosnians in every faction about the justice of bringing indicted war criminals before the International War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague.

  • Canada and its allies should put pressure on the governing parties of Bosnia to respect international human rights laws. Canada should also advocate the continued collection of evidence of war crimes allegations.

  • Canada should push for mediation of the dispute in Brc'ko. The preferred option would be to put the area under international control for a limited period of time.

  • Canada should support the North Atlantic Council as the main international decision-making body so that Canada has an equal voice on matters relating to Bosnia. Since Canada's voice is equal to its contribution, Canada should maintain its present level of commitment even if IFOR's size decreases considerably in the near future.


    III) ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION

    Overview

    The economic panel made clear the point that economic growth is not the most important ingredient for creating a lasting political solution in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it is an essential component of peace building. As Christine Wallich of the World Bank stated, economic growth gives each party a stake in peace. The first donor conference held in London this year raised $1.8 billion in pledges, but not all donors have made good on their commitment. In addition to international assistance, Bosnia's economic and social reconstruction depends to a great extent on the creation of stable financial institutions and the implementation of sound economic policies. Policy-makers must devise ways of promoting foreign investment and fostering private sector business in order to wean Bosnia off foreign assistance.


    Policy Recommendations


    General

  • Canadian economic and social reconstruction assistance in Bosnia must continue to be targeted, while at the same time remain flexible, due to financial constraints on Canada's aid program. It must also be multidimensional in its approach, finding a balance between multilateral assistance programs on the one hand, and Canadian initiatives and bilateral assistance on the other.

  • Canada must not lose sight of the fact that economic and social reconstruction serve two functions: creating income and wealth, and confidence building. They are part of a strategy to achieve peace and stability, not a strategy to be initiated after peace has been achieved. Economic reconstruction is vitally and functionally linked to security, re-integration of ethnic groups, political stability and nation-building.

  • Reconstruction assistance in the foreseeable future must be viewed as something between emergency humanitarian assistance and normal development assistance (as defined by the World Bank). Reconstruction must be accompanied by economic restructuring from a centrally-planned economy to a liberal, market-driven economy. The psychological as well as job-creating importance of small and micro enterprises should be recognized.


    Economic reconstruction

  • The most urgent and important economic objective in Bosnia is to create jobs and re-employ those who were gainfully employed before the war. In employment and re-employment programs, Canadian policy choices should favour:

    -- opening and broadening economic and commercial links between different ethnic communities;
    -- a "bottoms-up" approach, helping and fostering local initiatives and in particular small and medium-sized businesses;
    -- basic needs and public services;
    -- labour-intensive rather than capital-intensive projects since the priority is clearly to employ people at least cost, rather than securing international economic competitiveness;
    -- job training as a vital component of restructuring.

  • Canadian assistance should expand in the areas of informational or software infrastructure. Canadian expertise could contribute greatly, and at little cost, to the development and training in:

    -- an internal revenue service and financial police;
    -- arbitration of business disputes;
    -- information management at social or business office level;
    -- object-oriented, client/server-based information networks and systems;
    -- setting up of chambers of commerce and linking them to Canadian counterparts.

  • Canada can contribute significantly to the rebuilding of residential dwellings and other buildings destroyed in the war by providing technical expertise, technology transfers and appropriate job training for implementation of new technologies. This would introduce Canadian firms possessing such technologies into a new market which is destined to grow for a long time - especially those industries based on wood and waste material.

  • Canada should consider setting up a facility similar to the World Bank's Industry Project Guarantee Facility to encourage Canadian private investors to seek investment and joint venture opportunities in Bosnia.


    Social reconstruction

  • Canadian assistance should continue to focus on community-based initiatives and rehabilitation in the social sector.

  • Canada should encourage the development of grass roots NGOs that are not based solely on the Western model. Bosnians should draw on the experience and expertise of other types of social organization such as retired military personel, pensioners, women, self-help groups, volunteers, civic fora, independent media, human rights advocates, etc.

  • Canada must recognize and help convince other participants in the assistance effort, that reconstruction is a long, slow process and that social reconstruction efforts must be carried on systematically through the next elections and well beyond.

  • Additional policy recommendations include:

    -- encouragement of and working with local NGOs to ensure that they become a long-term part of the society and don't close or fail the moment foreign aid runs out;
    -- encouraging the establishment of sound environmental standards and environmental awareness;
    -- Canadian policy-makers and Canadian NGOs should tap into the experience, expertise and skills of Bosnian-Canadians.