Parliamentary International Forum

The Russian Presidential Elections: Prospects for Domestic and Foreign Policy

June 4, 1996

Biographies of Commentators


Jeremy Kinsman has been Canada's Ambassador to the Russian Federation since 1993. He is also accredited to Central Asian Countries and Armenia. Educated at Princeton University and L'institut d'Etudes politiques in Paris, he joined the Department of External Affairs in 1966. He served variously in Ottawa, Brussels and Algiers and New York before becoming Minister and Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York (1979-80). Thereafter he was (in succession) Chairman of the Policy Planning Secretariat in External Affairs (1980-81), Minister (Political Affairs) in the Canadian Embassy in Washington (1981-85), Assistant Deputy Minister (Cultural Affairs and Broadcasting) in the Department of Communications (1985-89), and Assistant Deputy Minister of Political and International Security Affairs in the Department of External Affairs (1990-92).

Sergei Plekhanov, born in Moscow, is a graduate of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. He joined the Institute for the Study of USA and Canada in 1968 becoming its Deputy Director in 1988. In 1985 he joined the group of academics advising Soviet President Gorbachev on reforming foreign and domestic policies, accompanying Gorbachev to his first summit with President Reagan in 1985. Dr. Plekhanov was a consultant on Soviet affairs to CBS News 1989-91. Since 1992 he has been teaching in North America: initially at the University of California at Irvine and Occidental College; more recently, at York University where he is an Associate Professor of Political Studies and Coordinator of the York Program of Transition Studies. His most recent book is Transforming Russian Enterprises: From State Control to Employee Ownership (1995).

A Background Note


Russia's presidential election, the first round slated to take place on June 16th, has wide- reaching implications because of uncertainty over the post-election political environment. Current polls suggest that the election will most likely enter a second round (since no candidate will have achieved the required 50%). Hence a two-man contest would ensue between the incumbent President Boris Yeltsin and the Communist Party leader Gennadii Zyuganov, with the run-off slated for July 7.

A May 18 poll taken by the Institute for Comparative Research showed that Zyuganov, backed by a coalition of left-leaning political groups known as the "popular-patriotic bloc", has fallen 8.4 percentage points behind Yeltsin. Most other pollsters, such as ROMIR-Gallup agency (who have Yeltsin at 32% against Zyuganov's 25%), are indicating similar results. Nevertheless, although the Yeltsin campaign appears to be picking up momentum, polls can be misleading in Russia. Many people are afraid to reveal their true preferences to pollsters. And there is a large portion of the electorate which remains undecided.

The other candidates are significantly behind. Attempts to create a "third force" -- a coalition of most of the more marginal candidates to combat the Yeltsin-Zyuganov race (the latest effort being initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev), have failed to materialize. However, supporters of these candidates will influence the election's final outcome in the second round, which explains Yeltsin's entreaties to candidates such as Yavlinskii (see chart below) to abandon the campaign in exchange for sacking key government officials such as Defence Minister Pavel Grachev who is deemed responsible for the crisis in Chechnya.


Leading Candidates for the Presidency of the Russian Federation

Svyatoslav Fedorov, Party of Worker's Self-Government
Aleksandr Lebed, Congress of Russian Communities
Grigorii Yavlinskii, Yabloko party
Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
Gennadii Zyuganov, Communist Party


The most salient campaign issues are the war in Chechnya, high levels of crime and administrative corruption, and the negative social effects of the transition towards a market-based economy. Yeltsin's failure to end the war in Chechnya has been burdensome to him throughout the campaign since his opponents have promised to end the confrontation. However, in a dramatic gesture by the President calculated to bolster his image as a peacemaker and thereby swell his vote total, Yeltsin undertook direct negotiations with the Chechens' leader, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, at the end of May which quickly led to a truce to end fighing in the 17-month conflict, effective June 1.

The effort to transform the Russian economy has polarized Russian society between those people who have benefited, such as entrepreneurs and former managers of state firms and those who have suffered, particularly people on fixed incomes such as the elderly, the infirm and others dependent on the security offered by a state welfare system. The former tend to support Yeltsin and liberal reformers such as Yavlinskii while the latter are more likely to support Zyuganov or extreme nationalists such as Zhirinovsky.

Zyuganov's pledge to slow down the pace of reform, coupled with calls from the more extreme elements in the "popular-patriotic front" for the renationalization of key sectors of the economy, such as banks and oil companies, has created fears that a Zyuganov victory will create dangerous tensions within Russian society. In recent weeks leading members of Russia's business community have urged reconciliation between the new "reds" (communists and their allies) and "whites" (the Yeltsin and reform forces) in order to mitigate such tensions if Zyuganov were victorious.

Both Yeltsin and Zyuganov are attempting to reach as many voters as possible by aiming for the centre of public opinion. This seems to have benefited Yeltsin more because, despite concerns about Chechnya and the economy, public perceptions that Yeltsin would be a less risky choice than Zyuganov appear to be growing. This view regards Yeltsin as standing for moderate change within a stable framework which Zyuganov threatens to upset and thereby polarize the society even more dramatically. The implications of such a view has caused some confusion in the Zyuganov camp. Eager to down play the more extreme elements which have called for nationalization of private industry, Zyuganov delayed the release of his economic program until May 25. It avoids Marxist rhetoric in favour of a Keynesian tone, stressing the importance of reviving demand. It calls for import controls, but does not threaten large-scale price controls or a wave of renationalization.

Foreign policy issues -- such as NATO expansion, the status of Russians living in other former Soviet Republics, and the creation of a new version of the old Soviet Empire through mutually- agreed-to treaties like the one recently signed with Belarus -- are less important for the average voter because domestic issues take precedence. Moreover, a rough convergence has taken place in the foreign policy pronouncements of both the leading candidates. Both Yeltsin and Zyuganov oppose NATO expansion, seek greater ties with former Soviet allies, and support accelerated integration of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Indeed, differences between Yeltsin and all his opponents over foreign policy are limited -- with the significant exception of the radical nationalist Zhirinovsky.

The Western and Canadian response toward Russia, regardless of the election's outcome, should remain unchanged: a policy of positive engagement and support for Russia's inclusion in cooperative international institutions and forums relating to security and economic matters (e.g., its recent inclusion in the OECD and the Council of Europe). Canada would seek cordial relations with whatever administration takes power in Russia provided global, and hence Canadian, security is not impaired. At the same time, Canada has also supported the process of economic transformation because it is seen to encourage long-term stability and because of the opportunities it creates for Canadian business. This would have to be balanced -- in the event of a Zyuganov victory -- with greater appreciation of the social strains that economic transformation has caused and is continuing to cause and the possibility that a "go-slow" approach on economic change may in the short- and medium-term be more condusive to social cohesion. In sum, Canada can be cautiously optimistic about Russia's immediate future and prepared to render assistance and expertise on an on-going basis to ensure that change continues within a relatively stable framework.
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