Parliamentary International Forum



The Russian Presidential Elections: Prospects for Domestic and Foreign Policy.


June 4, 1994

Ambassador Jeremy Kinsman


"The interest here is in who is going to win the Russian
presidential elections and what this means."

The political context in Russia has changed dramatically in the past 10 years. Elections happen, voter participation is high and power is largely decentralized and decontrolled. Free speech and free (if biased) media exits. 80% of the economy is privatized and prices are now decontrolled. The Cold War is over and Russia is now more or less a partner. The Russian military is no longer a threat to the West... or even the East.

The costs and downsides of these successes are also well known. Russia's GNP has fallen by 30%. The personal savings of honest people have been wiped out by inflation where as the widely perceived dishonest people are wildly wealthy. Services once administered by the government have deteriorated. Life expectancy is down where as the cost of funerals is up and the elderly are often destitute. Crime is rampant and, until recently, a terrible war has raged in Chechenya. All of which have contributed to a national sense of humiliation and distrust of the West.

As such, the present elections are not a Clinton-Dole or Major-Blair competition. Rather, they are elections of opposed views concerning the past and the future.

In this vein, Yeltsin can be seen as the representative of the up-sides discussed above and of three central tenets in particular that many Russians believe in. These are elections, private property and free speech. Reformers won on this very basis in the four key Russian cities. Yet across the land, sullen anger most adequately describes the publicUs mood. Simply put, the economic and political reform cycles were out of synchronous as too few people felt direct benefits from economic reform in time for these elections.

Alternately, Zyuganov and a communist resurgence fed on this widespread discontent to address these very serious issues. Zyuganov the politician has a very strong organization as many people have good reason to vote for him. In last DecemberUs legislative elections, Communists scored highly leading many people to predict a communist victory in these June elections (either with dire consequences or with little change).

"The probable fact is that Boris Yeltsin will win the elections."

Currently, Yeltsin is 10 points ahead, and this, much to the Western mediaUs surprise. But these elections have always been YeltsinUs to lose! It is true Zyuganoz did well in last DecemberUs elections, but these were a vote of protest. They donUt predict how Russians will vote for real power. To expect Zyuganov to steal 27-28% to 50% of the vote is to expect Russians to forget everything about the Past. We, as outside observers, often underestimate Russians. Indeed, they are badly informed but they are very educated. They are not looking for an autocratic czar (Yeltsin), a new Stalin (Zyuganov) or a goof (Zurinovsky). They want a strong leader and decisive action. They have been traumatized but they do not want more disruptive change or a polarized society. However, everybody does want the pace of change slowed... including Yeltsin.

What Yeltsin was able to do was from an undeclared coalition of those who benefit from change, those who believe change is necessary and those who so fear change they believe Communist Party counter-change would be more than they could handle. In a campaign that is both negative and populist, Yeltsin has made great efforts to reach out and enlarge his support. Simply, he is betting that widespread dislike of him would be less than fear of Communists getting real power and fear of huge counter-change.

"The leader's perspective"

At the beginning of the year, Jeremy Kinsman's memories of Yeltsin were that he was in dreadful shape. With a terrible war raging in Chechenya, his standing was embarrassingly bad in 1995. Events showed him to be misinformed and disobeyed, and this, even though he perceived himself much like a Charles De Gaulle, above all parties and with no organization. Yeltsin was also indirectly associated with corruption and was advised by several non-democrats who were out of any touch with the population. Yet, Yeltsin was able to turn this around with a rare exercise in self criticism. As reformers took over his campaign, calling the shots and telling him correct information, Yeltsin got sober and on message.

Considerable access to television and other communication media, as well as a natural capacity to mix and fine tune news have given Yeltsin a basic advantage. He has been able to distance himself from contrary news much like Reagan and Mitterand were able to do. He has also been able to slow the pace of change, stand up for Russia, look reasonable, become a rassembleur and conciliator reassuring the public. Simply, he has turned the elections into a contest between one democrat and one totalitarian.

All of these things the Communists have gotten wrong. Essentially, the polls show that their clientele has not grown. Simply, Zyuganov is stuck with the grievances of his core supporters which are elderly. Their concerns are over the state intervening to protect them from change, and as such, they may feel a sense of loss for the soviet state. But a return to the Empire is never a priority. Zyuganoz has to get past this core group and appeal to younger people. This will prove particularly difficult as no new generation of communist politicians (as in Poland or Hungary) exists. Elsewhere, a shift towards a social-democratic stance could effectively cost him his core constituency (with out it, he canUt win, particularly if the electoral turnout is high). Where Zyuganov has rattled sabers on neighboring states (particularly ones with ethnic-Russians), Yeltsin has understood that bad relations with Ukraine and the Baltic states are bad politics and bad economics which ultimately lead to more trauma and more refugees. As a campaigner, Zyuganov has no outreach, no human touch, no ability or even access to TV. Essentially, his strength has been his capability to go door-to-door, meeting people directly.

"And what if he won?"

If Zyuganov won, it is still difficult to forecast an expansionist or even isolationist Russia. One thing, however, is certain. After everything it has gone through, it would be a pity for Russia --and for its relations with the West-- to have such a leader. Even if elected to deal with Russia's internal mess, Zyuganov's victory would most certainly spell greater domestic turmoil. His economic program is retrograde, characterized by a closed mind leading closed men who donUt know what they donUt know! Indeed, much of the reform process already initiated is irreversible.

If Yeltsin win's, the transitional process of a new generation will continue. An interesting question we must ask, however, is whether he will maintain his new style, along with his new advisers? Or will Yeltsin relish victory with the old guard who are not democrats?
Notes from Sergei Plekhanov.

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